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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Hong Kong is widely believed to epitomize the practical virtues of the 
neoclassical economic model.  It consistently outranks other countries in 
terms of the criteria incorporated into the Heritage Foundation’s authoritative 
Index of Economic Freedom.  The periodically challenging and potentially 
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tumultuous transition from British to Chinese rule has thus far had no 
tangible impact on its status in this respect.  A new post-1997 political 
configuration, coupled with a series of exogenous shocks (the late 
twentieth century Asian financial crisis, the 2001-2002 global stock 
market rout, and environmental hazards such as bird flu and severe acute 
respiratory syndrome/SARS), and intensifying domestic pressures for 
greater government involvement in the economy, have inevitably left 
their imprint on the public policy constellation, but the structural 
characteristics and operational features of the system have undergone 
marginal rather than fundamental changes. 
A distinction needs to be drawn between the ideal Hong Kong 
represents and economic realities in the territory.  The latter have always 
deviated from the former (a cluster of stylized facts) and the gap may 
have grown larger over time in response to forces triggered in the course 
of modernization (notably, affluence, globalization, social complexity, 
and technological transformation and communications revolution).  The 
balance between the public and private sector has thus not been entirely 
static, reflecting a secular trend toward mild government expansion and 
occasionally cyclical, or rather countercyclical, flurry of public policy 
initiatives designed to stabilize a temporarily faltering economy.  This 
pattern may have become somewhat more pronounced following the 
reversion to Chinese rule but additional factors, systematic as well as ad 
hoc in nature, may have been at work. 
Consequently, government spending, aimed at supporting a considerable 
array of programs, cannot be dismissed as insignificant.  By the same 
token, public regulation of private sector activity should not be portrayed 
as a peripheral phenomenon.  Further, the government has not displayed 
a strong interest in “rolling back the frontiers of the State” or embracing 
economic liberalization, via privatization and deregulation.  It may thus 
be legitimately argued that the picture painted by neoclassical admirers 
of this supposedly last bastion of truly unfettered capitalism does not 
fully correspond to the institutional setup observed in practice and the 
divergence is the product of persistent influences, albeit not necessarily 
of the steady-state variety, rather than a historical aberration. 
It may however be inappropriate to insist on a near perfect match 
between a stylized model and the social milieu whose essence it endeavors 
to capture and employ merely absolute, as distinct from comparative, 
yardsticks in assessing its merits. From a relative perspective, Hong 
Kong, even at this juncture, may justifiably be singled out for its 
generally faithful, even if not unflinching, adherence to neoclassical 
economic principles.  Government spending continues to account for a 
comparatively modest fraction of the gross domestic product. More often 
than not, its revenue exceeds its expenditure and budget surpluses are 
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deliberately targeted and carefully managed.  Both fiscal and monetary 
policies (particularly the latter, because of a reliance on a linked-
exchange-rate-system with the U.S. dollar as its pivot) tend to be 
conducted according to predetermined rules rather than in a discretionary 
fashion.  Public regulation is not conspicuous by its absence, but the 
regime is at the “light touch” end of the control spectrum.1 
The corollary is that notable departures from the neoclassical ideal 
deserve careful consideration.  This is particularly the case if they are 
found in areas where there is substantial external exposure.  The reason 
lies in the fact that the desire to maintain a light touch has traditionally 
manifested itself perhaps most visibly in such areas.  Further, Hong 
Kong has long had an unmistakable international economic orientation, 
initially as an outward-looking manufacturing center (possibly even 
earlier as a modest entrepôt before the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950), and subsequently as a prominent service center (following the 
opening up of China in 1978).  Indeed, in recent years, the territory has 
evolved into a global metropolis performing intermediary-type functions 
beyond the Asia-Pacific region.2 
Current and capital account transactions proceed effectively unimpeded 
in Hong Kong.  There are virtually no barriers to foreign trade, in both 
goods and services, and investment  flows—in all its forms.  In fact, 
capital movements are not even tracked in a comprehensive manner.  
“Sin” taxes are imposed on some imported products, but this does not 
amount to a quantitatively and qualitatively significant deviation from 
the norm.  More importantly, such selective fiscal measures with modest 
external implications are generally aimed at correcting market failure 
(predominantly negative externalities and asymmetric information) rather 
than shielding domestic producers from foreign competition.  Local 
residents are taxed exclusively on income generated at home.  Migratory 
movements are subject to tighter restrictions, perhaps excessively so, 
and this is the sole meaningful macro-level posture that does not neatly 
accord with an otherwise extraordinarily liberal policy architecture. 
In specific sector or industrial domains, or at the micro level, 
government restraint is also noteworthy on the international economic 
 
 1. For a broader discussion of these issues, see Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, 
The Transfer of Property Rights from the Public to the Private Sector in Hong Kong: A 
Critical Assessment, 35 GLOBAL ECON. REV. 445, 445–61 (2006). 
 2. This role is methodically explored in DAVID R. MEYER, HONG KONG AS A 
GLOBAL METROPOLIS (2000). 
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front, even if it does not always match that exhibited in the macro realm.  
One intriguing exception to the rule is the aviation industry where a 
degree of policy rigidity has persisted for a long period of time in that 
the government has been steadfast in its reluctance to unambiguously 
embrace the logic of open skies and, from a wider perspective, to 
unilaterally pursue a laissez-faire agenda (in most other policy spheres, a 
liberal path has consistently been followed irrespective of the stance of 
actual/potential trade partners or prevailing international commercial 
practices).  The purpose of this Article is to provide a systematic explanation 
for that seemingly counterintuitive strategic pattern and to draw appropriate 
inferences regarding the functioning of international legal regimes, 
particularly ones shaped by powerful economic forces.  This is preceded 
by a discussion of the evolution of the concept around which the paper 
revolves and its application in Hong Kong. 
II.  TOWARD “OPEN SKIES” 
The aviation industry has witnessed dramatic policy and structural 
shifts since the Great Depression of the 1930’s.  The directional swings 
observed and their repercussions have arguably exceeded those seen in 
other segments of the transportation sector and, with some notable 
exceptions, possibly elsewhere in the economic space.  The United States 
has exercised strategic initiative on that front, shedding at critical historical 
junctures established regulatory frameworks and opting for new ones.  
Given its quasi-hegemonic status during the period in question, and the 
global nature of the aviation industry, innovative American institutional 
practices have spread throughout the industrialized world and beyond, 
albeit not necessarily without encountering any resistance or in a 
coordinated fashion.  Regime adaptation, while not entirely smooth, has 
thus been an international phenomenon. 
Airline regulation is a multidimensional undertaking.  From an economic 
perspective, the two key facets pertain to market entry and exit—price 
controls and rate regulation are equally salient but merit less attention in 
this context.  The former occurs when an existing airline institutes a 
service in a market or a combination of markets along a route; it may 
also take place following an entry into the airline business by a brand 
new enterprise, an increasingly common pattern in recent years.  The 
latter is a product of service discontinuation in a market by an airline; it 
may be the result of an independent corporate decision or government 
intervention.  Complex economic considerations drive movement in both 
directions, although profitability is the principal element in the equation.  
Socio-political factors feature prominently as well, particularly on the 
government side. 
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The pre-Great Depression or, to be precise, pre-1938 formal control of 
market entry and exit in the United States was to all intents and purposes 
nonexistent.  The sole restrictions in place concerned safety matters.  
However, from a practical standpoint, it was not realistically possible to 
operate an airline on a profitable basis without securing a heavily 
subsidized air mail contract from the Post Office Department. The 
Postmaster General thus effectively exercised significant power over 
market entry.  Prior to 1925, the Post Office Department operated its 
own fleet of aircraft to deliver air mail; the Kelly Act of 1925 led to a 
dismantling of this service and the emergence of the air mail-subsidized 
private airline; four carriers evolved into substantial players in the 
domestic arena and one came to dominate international routes during the 
1925-1938 period.3 
The Great Depression precipitated an attitudinal change regarding 
government intervention in the economy. The fiscal, monetary, and 
regulatory authorities adopted a more decisive stance and expanded their 
institutional capabilities in its wake. In 1938, pursuant to the Civil 
Aeronautics Act promulgated in that year, the economic side of airline 
operations was placed under the control of the federal government in a 
manner reflecting structural and functional principles followed elsewhere in 
the transportation sector (e.g., the regulation of surface carriers by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)) and other industries (e.g., the 
control of public utilities such as electricity-generating companies by 
State public utility commissions).  The agency formed to oversee the 
economic regulation of airlines was the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB).4 
The 1938 legislation rendered it illegal to operate a common carrier 
airline service without obtaining a “certificate of public convenience and 
necessity” from the CAB.  The board also had to determine  the airline 
was “fit, willing, and able” to provide the service and comply with the 
 
 3. See WILLIAM E. O’CONNOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIRLINE ECONOMICS 24–25 
(6th ed. 2001).  For additional insights, see ELIZABETH E. BAILEY, DAVID R. GRAHAM & 
DANIEL P. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES (1985); STEVEN MORRISON & 
CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1986); PAUL 
STEPHEN DEMPSEY & ANDREW R. GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE 
MYTHOLOGY (1992); Richard H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Airline Regulation 
and Deregulation, 1925–1998, in BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1870 
345–392 (Robert F. Himmelberg ed., 1994). 
 4. See O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at 1–2.  For additional insights, see BAILEY, 
GRAHAM, & KAPLAN, supra note 3; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 3; DEMPSEY & 
GOETZ, supra note 3; Vietor, supra note 3. 
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Civil Aeronautics Act and the board’s own specific functional criteria, 
commonly referred to as the “fitness requirements.” The certification 
procedure was not necessarily onerous, but it could not be portrayed as 
liberal either.  The CAB practices, as well as the spirit and letter of the 
underlying legislation, were not strongly geared toward the encouragement 
of entry into air transportation markets and the fostering of healthy 
competition.  Rather, a fine balance was sought between the conflicting 
values pertaining to industry structure and performance. The 1958 
Federal Aviation Act left these legislative and policy features largely 
intact.5 
The control of market exit was also tangibly tightened in response to 
the concerns triggered by the turmoil of the Great Depression and 
subsequent paradigm shift in economic theory and its application.  After 
1938, a certified airline needed to secure CAB authorization to suspend 
operations in any market on its certificate. This configuration was 
underpinned by strategic logic reflecting seemingly broad public interest 
imperatives, as distinct from purely commercial ones. To state it 
differently, an airline was expected to furnish service rather than merely 
maximize profits. Flying in commercially unviable market niches in 
return for being granted a protected franchise to operate in profitable 
segments was viewed as part of the bargain.  In that vein, proceedings to 
discontinue service often led to public hearings which community 
representatives endeavored to employ as a vehicle for maintaining the 
status quo.6 
The Keynesian foundations of the post-Great Depression economic 
order proved more fragile than anticipated.  Widespread manifestations 
of macro- and micro-level government failure—culminating in a painful 
stagflationary episode that stretched over an entire decade of the 
1970’s—have resulted in another paradigm shift, toward the libertarian end 
of the policy and ideological spectrum.  As events unfolded in that 
direction, CAB decisions began to follow a less restrictive path, displaying a 
not previously apparent willingness to accommodate commercially 
driven demand for market entry and exit, as well as allowing airlines to 
exercise a higher degree of discretion regarding rates.  Such informal 
 
 5. See O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at 24–39.  For additional insights, see BAILEY, 
GRAHAM, & KAPLAN, supra note 3; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 3; DEMPSEY & 
GOETZ, supra note 3; Vietor, supra note 3. 
 6. See O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at 39.  For additional insights, see BAILEY, 
GRAHAM, & KAPLAN, supra note 3; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 3; DEMPSEY & 
GOETZ, supra note 3; Vietor, supra note 3. 
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practices have assumed an unambiguously authoritative form following 
the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.7 
Although its name may suggest otherwise, this landmark piece of 
legislation did not eliminate post-Great Depression era economic control 
mechanisms over the aviation industry in one sweep.  Rather, deregulatory 
measures were implemented in a stepwise fashion.  In 1981, control over 
domestic entry and exit effectively ceased. Control over domestic 
commercial cargo was removed somewhat earlier and control over 
passenger fares was terminated a year later.  By late 1984, the CAB 
itself was dismantled and its remaining functions were transferred to the 
Department of Transportation (DOT).  Perhaps the most economically 
significant among those which survived the institutional revamping was 
the authority over foreign air services—from and to the United States, by 
both American and foreign airlines—now wielded by the DOT.8 
Initially, the systematic loosening of government grip over the aviation 
industry was largely confined to the United States.  Other countries were 
generally reluctant to embrace the underlying philosophical premises 
and emulate the new practices. The trend toward rolling back the 
frontiers of the State however evolved before long into an Anglo-Saxon 
phenomenon, spreading subsequently to Western Europe, and eventually 
assuming effectively global dimensions.  By the mid-1990’s, the deregulation 
of air transportation services reached an advanced stage in terms of its 
geographic breadth as well as its functional depth, although the process 
of decontrol had not been entirely smooth and some resistance to the 
liberal impulses originating from countries firmly committed to 
shrinking government tentacles has continued to surface periodically (at 
times requiring the superior bargaining power of the United States to 
neutralize it, or at least to blunt its sharp edges).9 
The geographic unevenness of support for deregulation—originally 
epitomized by the liberal posture of a handful of countries led by the 
United States and the reticence displayed by most others—has been 
 
 7. See O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at 2–3.  For additional insights, see BAILEY, 
GRAHAM, & KAPLAN, supra note 3; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 3; DEMPSEY & 
GOETZ, supra note 3; Vietor, supra note 3. 
 8. See O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at 2–3.  For additional insights, see BAILEY, 
GRAHAM, & KAPLAN, supra note 3; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 3; DEMPSEY & 
GOETZ, supra note 3; Vietor, supra note 3. 
 9. See O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at 3.  For additional insights, see GEORGE 
WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION (1993); GEORGE 
WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S MIXED LEGACY (2002). 
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particularly apparent on the international front.  The Paris Convention of 
1919 enshrined the principle of States’ right to exercise sovereignty in 
the air space over their territory and this has crystallized into one of the 
three key tenets underpinning air law, the other two being the principles 
of aircraft nationality—whereby an aircraft must bear the nationality of 
the State in which it is registered—and cabotage—which grants States 
full authority with respect to foreign aviation activity undertaken in their 
airspace, including the power to restrict a foreign aircraft from landing at 
any of its airports.10 
The notion of “absolute and unlimited sovereignty” faced competitive 
challenges at the turn of the twentieth century.  Some legal scholars and 
practitioners adopted Grotius’ high seas argument and highlighted the 
merits of a complete freedom of air space.  Others sought practical ways, 
reflecting prevailing technological capabilities, to limit State jurisdiction, to 
one thousand feet above its territory, without significantly diluting it.  A 
third group followed a conceptually similar but somewhat less flexible 
tack by aiming at a compromise formula that would consider the entire 
air space over a country as national domain, coupled however, with an 
acceptance of the right of innocent passage through it.  The public good 
attributes of air space (i.e., lack of natural, physical boundaries) and military 
concerns, which were rife in the period preceding the First World War, 
eventually tipped the balance in favor of the idea of absolute and unlimited 
sovereignty, given authoritative expression in the Paris Convention.11 
As a corollary, States have subsequently enjoyed complete and 
unfettered control over their air space, being unencumbered by external 
constraints and exercising wide discretion in regulating air traffic flows 
within their borders.  National air space has thus been “de jure closed for 
foreign aircraft and their operators.”12  At the policy management level, 
individual governments, through the implementation of national laws, 
have been exclusively responsible for controlling market entry, exit, 
competition, prices, airport operations, pace of growth, and reach of the 
aviation industry.  Regulation has for all intents and purposes been a 
domestic enterprise lacking a salient international dimension.13  This is 
not to imply national laws are the sole source of air law; also included in 
 
 10. See Alexander Parets, Freedom of the Skies: International Law and the 
Aviation Industry, 5 GLOBAL TOPICS E-JOURNAL, Article #2007-3, 4–5 (2007), http:// 
www.anselm.edu/nhiop/research/arc/intaffairs/global+topics/archive/2007+Global+Topi
cs.htm.  For a broader overview, which remains effective today, see BIN CHENG, THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (1962). 
 11. See Parets, surpa note 10, at 2–3. 
 12. Pablo Mendes de Leon, The Dynamics of Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in 
International Aviation Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
483, 484 (Gerald Kreijen ed., 2002). 
 13. See ANTHONY E. BROWN, THE POLITICS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 45 (1987). 
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this category are multilateral agreements, bilateral agreements, contracts 
between air carriers and other entities, and general principles of international 
law.14 
The doctrine of absolute and unlimited sovereignty both acknowledged and 
reinforced the status of a country’s air space as a highly valuable natural 
resource.  One of its practical upshots was an erosion of support for a 
potentially laissez-faire approach to international aviation, broadly rooted in 
pre-twentieth century economic attitudes and conduct, and the emergence of 
a loose pattern of bilateral agreements between countries possessing 
airlines, whether privately or publicly owned, and countries to or through 
which those airlines sought to fly.  While this configuration reflected strong 
domestic/national interests, and was solidly underpinned in the conceptual/ 
legal sense of the term, ad hoc bilateralism imposed considerable costs on 
the parties involved and its adverse consequences became increasingly 
obvious in the period leading up to the Second World War.15 
The representatives of fifty-two States who met in Chicago in 1944 to 
address the issue, and whose efforts culminated in the signing of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, commonly referred to as the 
Chicago Convention, were aware of the limitations of the existing 
arrangements regarding the exchange of traffic rights, or “freedoms of 
the air”—as well as the control of fares, freight tariffs, flight frequencies, 
and capacity—and the need to design a more effective governance 
framework.  Competitive imbalances, stemming from differences in the 
economic burden carried in confronting the Axis powers and market 
structure, nevertheless impeded progress toward that goal.  The United 
States, whose aviation industry was expected to emerge in far better 
shape following the termination of military hostilities than those of its 
allies, favored a shift toward a maximum exchange of traffic rights—as 
well as the elimination of other relevant restrictions—and it’s open skies 
strategy was supported by countries with a small home base—such as 
the Netherlands and Sweden. By contrast, nations seriously enfeebled 
by the war—such as the United Kingdom and France—took a distinctly 
less liberal stance.16 
The Chicago conference participants did make palpable headway on 
 
 14. See Parets, supra note 10, at 3.  For additional insights, see CHENG, supra note 
10. 
 15. See RIGAS DOGANIS, FLYING OFF COURSE: THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
AIRLINES 30–31 (3rd ed., 2002). 
 16. See id. 
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several fronts and, in fact, may be credited with laying the foundation for 
the orderly and safe development of international air transportation.  
They failed however, inter alia, to reach an agreement on the mutual 
exchange of commercial traffic rights (the Third and Fourth Freedoms, 
which allow the mutual exchange of traffic rights between two countries, 
enabling their respective airlines to carry passengers and freight between 
their territories; and the Fifth Freedom, which entails a right granted by 
country A to an airline(s) from country B to carry traffic between A and 
countries other than B).  From the mid-1940’s onward, each country has 
thus negotiated a series of bilateral agreements with trading partners—
known as “bilaterals”—anchored in the new “multi lateral” order, whose 
purpose has been to regulate two-way air transportation services, 
primarily market entry and related matters such as points to be served 
and traffic rights, and secondarily flight frequencies and capacity.17 
A bilateral typically consists of a wide range of Articles elaborately 
addressing a host of strategic and operational matters, with the economic 
dimension accorded particular prominence.  The heart of these agreements 
has consistently featured the notion of reciprocity, denoting a fair and 
equal exchange of rights between countries very different in size and 
with airlines of different strengths.  This has traditionally been encapsulated 
in an Article containing the words, “[t]here shall be fair and equal 
opportunity for the airlines of both Contracting Parties to operate the agreed 
service on the specified routes between their respective territories.”18  
Nevertheless, reciprocity should not be invariably equated with liberalism 
as during the early phases of the evolution of the post-Chicago Convention 
regime, bilaterals often displayed a protectionist bias.19 
Bermuda-style accords, mirroring the air services agreement signed in 
1946 by the United Kingdom and the United States in the British 
overseas territory, were a notable exception to the restrictive norm.  
They exhibited considerable flexibility regarding Fifth Freedom rights, 
subject to certain constraints, usually linking their exercise to the end-to-
end traffic potential of the routes, and their accommodative characteristics 
manifested themselves in other areas (e.g., with respect to frequency or 
capacity on the routes and tariffs), albeit not necessarily in an open-
ended fashion (e.g., provisions were incorporated to allow a subsequent 
review of arrangements relating to frequency or capacity, in the event 
the interests of an airline were more adversely affected than initially 
assumed).  Bermuda-style bilaterals gained increasing currency as the 
pace of economic globalization accelerated and gradually superseded the 
 
 17. See id. at 31–32. 
 18. Id. at 33. 
 19. See id. 
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less liberal accords of the traditional variety in the industrialized world, 
as illustrated in Table 1.20 
TABLE 1                                                                                                                               
KEY FEATURES OF TRADITIONAL AND                                                       
BERMUDA-STYLE BILATERALS 
 TRADITIONAL BERMUDA-STYLE 
MARKET 
ACCESS 
Only specified and limited number of points/routes to be 
operated by each airline. 
 Few Fifth Freedoms granted. Several Fifth Freedoms  
granted but total capacity 
related to end-to-end (i.e., 
Third/Fourth Freedom)  
demand on route.  
 Charter traffic rights not included. 
DESIGNATION Single  Generally single but some 
double or multiple. 
 Airlines must be under substantial ownership and 
effective control of nationals of designating State. 
CAPACITY Capacity to be agreed or  
fifty-fifty split. 
No frequency or capacity 
control but capacity 
review if one airline too 
adversely affected. 
 Inter-airline revenue pool required 
(by some bilaterals). 
TARIFFS Tariffs related to cost plus profit. 
Approval of both governments needed (i.e., double approval). 
Wherever possible, airlines should use IATA procedures. 
Adapted from Douganis, The Airline Business in the Twenty-First Century, 
op.cit., p. 21. 
The domestically-generated post-1978 deregulatory impulses spilled 
over into the international arena, further enhancing externally-oriented 
liberalization efforts, albeit in a persistently uneven fashion from a 
geographic perspective and hence inevitably with ambiguous results.  
 
 20. See id. at 33–34; RIGAS DOGANIS, THE AIRLINE BUSINESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 21–23 (2001). 
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The rise of consumerism in developed countries, the proliferation of 
competitively-priced (by International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
criteria) non-scheduled services, and the emergence of Asian airlines 
operating outside the confines of the IATA tariff system—and thus able 
to offer superior service standards and capture a growing share of the 
trans-Pacific and parallel European market—provided the impetus for a 
selective shift toward greater flexibility in managing bilateral 
relationships in the rapidly restructuring aviation industry.  The non-
scheduled service and Asian challenges rendered it difficult to negotiate 
agreements within the IATA organizational orbit.21 
The United States spearheaded the deregulation drive, endeavoring to 
reverse an institutional pattern characterized by a propensity toward a 
high degree of market concentration.  It was initially supported by a 
handful of small Asian and European countries—such as Singapore and 
the Netherlands—but before long, a number of larger and economically 
more prominent nations—such as the United Kingdom—recalibrated 
their strategies in a similar manner.  American negotiators employed 
access to the vast U.S. market as a bargaining ploy in prodding other 
countries into fine-tuning bilateral accords along increasingly liberal 
lines.  The revised U.S.-Netherlands 1978 air services agreement set the 
trend in this respect, evolving into a model emulated in one form or 
another in a variety of geographic contexts, with or without, notably in 
intra-European settings, but also in intra-Asian ones, direct American 
participation.  The momentum produced led to an internationally meaningful, 
albeit not unqualified, acceptance and spread of open market bilaterals 
during the 1978-1991 period, which is summarized in Table 2.22 
 
 21. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 22–23; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 50–51.  For 
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF 
DEREGULATION, supra note 9; WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S 
MIXED LEGACY, supra note 9. 
 22. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 23–30; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at. 51–60.   
For additional insights, see WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF 
DEREGULATION, supra note 9; WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S 
MIXED LEGACY, supra note 9. 
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TABLE 2                                                                                                                               
KEY FEATURES OF PRE-1978 AND POST-1978                                                    
“OPEN MARKET” BILATERALS 
 PRE-1978 BILATERALS POST-1978 BILATERALS 
MARKET 
ACCESS 
Only to points specified Open access-airlines can 
fly between any two 
points 
 Unlimited Fifth Freedoms 
granted—more in US 
bilaterals 
Extensive Fifth-Freedom 
rights granted in US 
bilaterals but still very 
limited in intra-
European bilaterals 
 Charter rights not included Unlimited charter rights 
granted (in Europe 
granted earlier under 
1956 ECAC agreement) 
 
DESIGNATION Single—some multiple in 
US bilaterals 
Multiple 
 Airlines must be “substantially owned and effectively 
controlled” by nationals of designating State. 
 Single  Generally single but 
some double or multiple. 
 Airlines must be under substantial ownership and 
effective control of nationals of designating State. 
CAPACITY Capacity to be agreed or  
50:50 
No frequency or 
capacity controls 
 
 No capacity/frequency controls in liberal bilaterals, but 
subject to review. 
TARIFFS Double disapproval (i.e., only both governments can 
block). 
 To be agreed using IATA country-of-rules origin rules  
Procedures (in some US bilaterals). 
Adapted from Doganis, Flying Off-Course: The Economics of International 
Airlines, op.cit., p. 58. 
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The new constellation represented a marked shift toward a less 
restrictive and more competitive environment for international airlines.  
The open-market architecture, although incomplete, nevertheless continued 
to encounter considerable headwinds and was by no means universally 
embraced.  By the early 1990’s, the markets for scheduled air transport 
from and to the United States and Canada were significantly liberalized.  
Entry posed few problems because of multiple designation and capacity 
or frequency constraints effectively vanished; the closely regulated 
tariffs negotiated through IATA channels gave way to a less rigid system 
of fare zones, with airlines enjoying wide latitude to set their fares 
anywhere within the relevant agreed zones for each fare type; and 
measures to control and standardize service were withdrawn.  Progress 
on trans-Pacific routes was substantial but somewhat more modest and 
the picture within Europe varied from the relatively liberal (e.g., 
Netherlands, United Kingdom) to the relatively restrictive (e.g., Austria, 
Greece) ends of the policy spectrum.  Beyond this geographic core, 
liberalization made limited headway.23 
At that juncture, pressures against bilateralism, even of the enlightened 
variety, began to intensify.  Expert opinion, reinforced by converging 
political interests, swung in favor of the view that the aviation industry 
should be normalized, or allowed to function on terms similar to its 
major international counterparts, rather than as a quasi-public utility.  
The rigidities inherent in bilateralism, again even if sophisticated in 
nature, also increasingly came to be perceived as costly impediments to 
potentially beneficial exchanges in the global economic arena.  Last but 
not least, there was a growing recognition that the aviation industry 
matured greatly since the deregulation process started in earnest.  It was 
thus fundamentally more resilient than at any point in the past and 
capable of facing new challenges.  These themes were given prominence 
in the 1992 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Montreal 
Colloquium.24 
Consistent with the pattern observed throughout the liberalization era, 
the United States was at the forefront of efforts to translate a crystallizing 
theoretical consensus into concrete action, paving the way for the emergence 
of the post-1992 open skies regime.  New dynamic airlines—such as 
American, Delta, and United—gained a foothold in the domestic market, 
displaying effectiveness no longer exhibited by their established 
 
 23. See sources cited supra note 22. 
 24. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 30–31; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 60–61.  For 
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF 
DEREGULATION, supra note 9; WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S  
MIXED LEGACY, supra note 9. 
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predecessors—such as Pan American and Trans World Airlines 
(TWA)—and they were eager to reap the advantages of economies of 
scale stemming from the large size of their home market (i.e., lower unit 
costs) by expanding abroad.  An outward-looking strategy was also 
dictated in this case by competitive constraints faced in an increasingly 
saturated domestic arena.  Commercial U.S. interests thus combined with 
ideologically and intellectually-inspired bureaucratic ones, channeled 
through the DOT and the State Department, to propel the policy machine 
in a markedly more liberal direction.25 
The specific turning point assumed the form of the first genuine open 
skies accord signed in 1992, as on similar occasions in past, by the 
American and Dutch governments.  KLM, the Netherlands-based airline 
and national carrier of the country, did not need to be subtly maneuvered 
into entering into the agreement as it materially benefited from the 1978 
“open market” accord with the United States and was keen to boost its 
market share on the lucrative routes linking Amsterdam and American 
destinations.  The 1992 agreement, which set the stage for a new phase of 
international deregulation, retained some of the key feature of its 1978 
predecessor—multiple designation of airlines, no frequency or capacity 
controls, and open charter access—and incorporated new, more liberal 
ones—open route access (airlines from either country can fly to any 
point in the other with full traffic rights), unlimited Fifth Freedom rights, 
no traffic controls unless traffic is too high or too low, airlines free to 
code share or enter into other commercial accords, permitting break-of-
gauge (when an aircraft type changes at a stopping point of a direct flight).26 
The open skies agreements negotiated in subsequent years, and 
generally modeled on the 1992 American-Dutch accord, were deemed to 
be superior from an economic perspective to the open market variants 
which they replaced, particularly in terms of market access and tariff 
control.  Notably, they provided unlimited access to any point in either 
country, whereas the previous bilaterals tended to impose restrictions on 
the number of points that could be served by foreign airlines in the 
United States.  By the same token, unlike during the 1978–1991 period, 
 
 25. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 31–32; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 61–62.  For 
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S MIXED 
LEGACY, supra note 9. 
 26. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 32; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 62.  For 
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S MIXED 
LEGACY, supra note 9. 
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mutual Fifth Freedom rights were granted unconditionally.  Regarding 
tariffs, double disapproval or the country of origin rule gave way to a 
commitment to refrain from government intervention other than in 
exceptional circumstances in order to minimize the scope for discriminatory 
practices, maximize consumer welfare (by shielding service recipients 
from excessively high or restrictive prices), and furnish airlines with a 
level playing and commercially productive field (undermined in the 
preceding years by government subsidies and support).  Table 3 summarizes 
some of the significant features.27 
TABLE 3                                                                                                                              
KEY FEATURES OF US 1978-1991 “OPEN MARKET”                                        
AND POST-1991 “OPEN SKIES” BILATERALS 











for non-US carriers. 




 Domestic cabotage not allowed.  
Seventh Freedom not granted. 
Open Charter access. 
DESIGNATION Multiple Substantial ownership 
and effective control by 
nationals of designating 
State. 
CAPACITY No frequency or capacity control. 




Not part of bilateral. Code sharing 
permitted. 
 
Adapted from Doganis, The Airline Business in the Twenty-First Century, 
op.cit., p. 37; Doganis, Flying Off-Course: The Economics of International 
Airlines, op.cit., p. 65. 
 
 27. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 36–37; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 65–66.   For 
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S MIXED 
LEGACY, supra note 9. 
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The latest American deregulatory initiative provoked an even more 
determined response on the other side of the Atlantic.  While the United 
States pursued liberalization within a bilateral context, the European 
Union (E.U.), known until 1993 as the European Community, appropriately 
went a step further and embraced multilateralism within its confines.  
Two non-members, Iceland and Norway, also effectively joined the scheme.  
Moreover, whereas the open skies bilaterals left the nationality rule 
intact, the E.U. multilateral framework allowed cross-border majority 
ownership. Because their liberalization drive assumed deeper proportions, 
the Europeans deemed it essential to implement in parallel a countervailing 
competition policy designed to prevent market-distorting practices 
detrimental to institutional efficiency, as well as fairness and transparency, 
and consumer welfare, broadly encompassing cartels and restrictive 
agreements, mergers and monopolies, and government aid or subsidies to 
producers.28 
The open skies regime continues to evolve, though not necessarily at 
a breakneck pace, and remains an unfinished enterprise, both 
geographically and functionally.  Many of the accords governing air 
transportation between the United States and countries outside the E.U., 
and vice versa, have not progressed beyond the traditional-style pre-
1978 or, at best, post-1978 open market stage.  The contrast between the 
patterns observed within the E.U. and between the E.U. and the rest of 
the world—with some exceptions, such as the United States—is particularly 
glaring.  Asia has not lagged significantly behind, but it is interesting to 
note that few countries in this dynamic and outward-looking region have 
consistently sought to fully match the policy reforms originating on both 
sides of the Atlantic—New Zealand and Singapore may be singled out 
as the most accommodating and favorably disposed and interested 
players.29 
 
 28. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 38–43; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 66–69.  For 
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S MIXED 
LEGACY, supra note 9. 
 29. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 44–58; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 69–74.  For 
additional insights, see O’CONNOR, supra note 3.  WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: 
DEREGULATION’S MIXED LEGACY, supra note 9; Rauf Gönenç & Giussepe Nicoletti, 
Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Air Passenger Transportation, 32 
OECD ECON. STUD. 183, 183–227 (2001); Wolfgang Hubner & Pierre Sauvé, 
Liberalization Scenarios for International Air Transport, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 973, 973–
987 (2001); Jim Bergeron et al., International Transportation Law, 40 INT’L LAWYER 
403, 403–15 (2006); JAGDISH N. SHETH ET AL., DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION: 
LESSONS FROM THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY (2007); Jacob A. Warden, “Open Skies” at a 
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By the same token, even in relatively deregulated global market 
segments the open skies strategy has not been pursued in a functionally 
comprehensive fashion.  Specifically, movement toward the exchange of 
certain traffic rights has been painfully slow.  Perhaps the two most prominent 
examples offered in this context have been the right of an airline to carry 
domestic traffic between two airports within the territory of the other 
signatory country to the bilateral agreement, which constitutes an 
extension of international flights within that country, referred to in 
technical parlance as cabotage, and the right to carry passengers between 
points in two foreign countries by an airline operating wholly outside its 
home base, commonly termed the Seventh Freedom.  Similar resistance 
to liberalization, indeed more intense in nature, has been encountered 
with respect to the foreign ownership of airlines.30 
To make matters worse, adherence to the spirit, and possibly the letter, 
of the open skies regime has not been invariably strict. The United 
States, the principal architect and key pillar of the system, has been 
particularly prone to capitalize on substantial power asymmetries 
characterizing the relationships between market participants and has at 
various junctures opportunistically twisted the rules to protect American 
airlines.  Notwithstanding this behavior, the open skies regime has 
continued to expand both quantitatively and qualitatively.  The process 
has not been smooth or costless from the perspective of all the parties 
involved, consumers as well as producers.  Nevertheless, meaningful 
headway has been made and the overall gains are assumed to have 
outweighed the broad disadvantages in terms of relevant economic 
yardsticks.31  Given the backdrop, it would be reasonable to expect 
 
Crossroads: How the United States and the European Union Should Use the ECJ 
Transport Cases to Reconstruct the Transatlantic Aviation Regime, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 227, 227–55 (2003); Ryan Eddings, Tentative Agreement in EU-US “Open Skies” 
Talks, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 257, 257–71 (2006). 
 30. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 44–58; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 69–74.  For 
additional insights, see Gönenç & Nicoletti, supra note 29; Hubner & Sauvé, supra note 
29; O’CONNOR, supra note 3; WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S 
MIXED LEGACY, supra note 9; Bergeron et al., supra note 29; SHETH ET AL., supra note 
29; Warden, supra note 29; Eddings, supra note 29. 
 31. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 19–58; Gönenç & Nicoletti, supra note 29; 
O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at 46–67; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 48–74; 
INTERVISTASCONSULTING, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE OPEN SKIES INITIATIVE: 
PAST AND FUTURE (2005), http://www.intervistas.com/4/reports/Econ%20Impact% 
20of%20Open%20Skies%2030Jun2005.pdf; Dorothy Robyn, James Reitzes & Boaz 
Moselle, Beyond Open Skies: The Economic Impact of a US-EU Open Aviation Area, in 
DEEP INTEGRATION: HOW TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS ARE LEADING GLOBALIZATION 50 
(Daniel Hamilton & Joseph Quinlan eds., 2005), available at http://transatlantic.sais-
jhu.edu/OpenSkies.pdf; BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF AN OPEN 
AVIATION AREA BETWEEN THE EU AND THE US (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/transport/ 
air_portal/international/pillars/global_partners/doc/us/eu_us_study_executive_summary.
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quintessentially market-oriented polities to unambiguously embrace the 
system. 
III.  HONG KONG RESPONSE 
Foreign trade has been the principal engine of growth driving Asian 
economies throughout industrialization and, where appropriate, beyond.  
For Hong Kong this has been the case during its entire history and, 
because of the distinctly modest size of the domestic market, as well as 
locational influences and the flexible policy framework, on a comparatively 
much larger scale than witnessed in other parts of the region, with the 
notable exception of Singapore.  International transportation in all its forms 
has been an integral component of the picture, with substantial resources 
being channeled into infrastructure supporting it.  Hong Kong boasts one 
of the world’s busiest and most sophisticated airport complexes—
although the center of gravity for shipping, a land-intensive industry, in 
Southern China is gradually shifting to the mainland due to the greater 
availability and lower cost of land across the border—which literally 
functions as the lifeline of its widely open economy. 
Up-to-date statistics regarding the state of the aviation and shipping 
industries are not easy to obtain due to rapid shifts in key performance 
parameters.  To illustrate Hong Kong’s prominence as an aviation hub, it 
is possible to rely on 2006 figures showing that the territory is served by 
about eighty-five airlines.  Each week over 5,600 flights take place, 
reaching more than 150 destinations across the globe.  In 2006, the Hong 
Kong International Airport (HKIA) handled approximately 44.45 
million passengers and around 3.58 million tons of air cargo. Aircraft 
movements in the same year amounted to roughly 280,500.  Of the 25.2 
million visitors to the territory, about 34.2%  arrived by air.  In value 
terms, the HKIA processed approximately 37.5%, 30.3%, and 38.1% 
of the territory’s vital exports, re-exports, and imports respectively.32 
 
pdf; IATA, Airline Liberalisation, IATA ECONOMICS BRIEFING NO. 7 (2007), http:// 
www.iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/85EE6A15-43EB-4D34-A13E-418F404091EF/0/890000_ 
Airline_Liberalisation_Summary_Report.pdf.  For additional insights, see Hubner & 
Suavé, supra note 29; WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S MIXED 
LEGACY, supra note 9; Bergeron et al., supra note 29; SHETH ET AL., supra note 29; 
Warden, supra note 29; Eddings, supra note 29. 
 32. See Hong Kong Government, Airport and Aviation Services, http://www. 
thb.gov.hk/eng/policy/transport/issues/air01.pdf (last visited on Jan. 24, 2009). 
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This statistical portrait reflects Hong Kong’s position as a leading 
service center in general and a thriving aviation hub in particular—in the 
Greater China, Asian, and worldwide context, a global metropolis.  The 
territory has achieved this status despite constraints stemming form the 
lack of sovereign power.  Unlike Singapore, which has carved out a broadly 
similar niche for itself in otherwise roughly similar circumstances, it 
does not even qualify as a city State. Nor can close parallels be drawn 
with Bahrain and Dubai, which apparently are undergoing transformation 
into large-scale providers of intermediary services against the backdrop 
of an economic boom underpinned by escalating oil prices.  In any case, 
it is premature to portray these two regional commercial centers as the 
pivots of an extensive and multidimensional global network. 
Lack of sovereign power has limited Hong Kong’s room to maneuver 
in the international arena and has at times imparted a cautious quality to 
its externally-oriented policies.33  Nevertheless, the territory has historically 
exercised a substantial degree of autonomy in economic matters, both on 
the domestic front and outwardly. It has thus consistently pursued a 
semi-independent aviation strategy—semi-independent rather than independent 
because of its position as a British colony and a Special Administrative 
Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—and has 
enjoyed even greater latitude regarding tactical and operational issues.  
The strategy and its implementation have been sustained by locally-
established financial and institutional capabilities.34 
The transition from British to Chinese rule has had no concrete legal 
and policy repercussions on Hong Kong’s freedom of action in the 
aviation domain.  A high measure of continuity from the configuration 
prevailing during the colonial era35 to the potentially challenging political 
constellation to emerge following the absorption into the body politic of 
a nominally communist State36 has been technically secured via relevant 
international (albeit strictly bilateral in nature) legal and constitutional 
 
 33. For an overview, see RODA MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY, TWO INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE CASE OF HONG KONG (1997); Roda Mushkat, Hong Kong’s 
Exercise of External Autonomy: A Multi-Faceted Appraisal, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 945, 
945–962 (2006). 
 34. See Hong Kong Government, supra note 32. 
 35. For pre-1997 insights, see Gary N. Heilbronn, The Changing Face of Hong 
Kong’s International Air Transport Relations, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 195, 195–224 
(1988); Gary N. Heilbronn, Hong Kong’s First Bilateral Air Services Agreement: A 
Milestone in Air Law and an Exercise in Limited Sovereignty, 18 HONG KONG L.J. 62–85 
(1988); Gary N. Heilbronn, The Travel Industry, in LAW IN HONG KONG 1969–1989 325, 
325-359 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1989); ESSAYS ON AVIATION AND TRAVEL LAW IN HONG 
KONG (Gary N. Heilbronn ed., 1990). 
 36. See Hong Kong Government, supra note 32; YASH GHAI, HONG KONG’S NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC 
LAW 465, 465–67 (2d ed. 1999). 
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instruments.  The Basic Law, which falls into the latter category and carries 
more practical significance in this context, contains several provisions 
designed to solidify Hong Kong’s status as a semi-autonomous aviation 
hub.  Perhaps most noteworthy in this respect is the injunction to the 
HKSAR government to furnish conditions and take steps for the 
maintenance of the territory’s position as a center for international and 
regional aviation (Article 128). 
In terms of specific arrangements impinging on strategic management, 
Hong Kong has been allowed to keep its own aircraft register, albeit in 
accordance with guidelines formulated by the Central People’s Government 
(CPG) regarding nationality marks and registration marks of aircraft 
(Article 129).  The local register is a branch of its PRC counterpart, and 
the aircraft of both entities have the same nationality.37  At the tactical 
and operational level, Hong Kong is responsible for “routine business 
and technical management of civil aviation” and the discharge of functions 
assigned to it under the regional procedures of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (Article 130).  These encompass the technical 
administration of airports, air traffic services—communications, navigation 
aids, and traffic control—and flight operations.38 
The provisions pertaining to the conclusion of air services agreements 
are less straightforward, but they leave considerable room for maneuver 
for the local authorities.  A distinction is drawn between three inherently 
different categories of air services: (1) those between Hong Kong and 
foreign States; (2) those between Hong Kong and the mainland; and    
(3) those between Hong Kong and foreign States which stop over in 
Hong Kong.  The power to decide on air services falling into the second 
category, and operated either by airlines incorporated and having their 
principal business in Hong Kong or by their PRC counterparts, is vested 
in the CPG, following consultation with the HKSAR government (Article 
131).  Similarly, category three-type air services accords are concluded 
by the CPG, although it needs to take into consideration the “special 
conditions and economic interests” of Hong Kong and seek the views of 
its government.  Moreover representatives of the latter may take part in 
negotiations conducted by the CPG regarding such operations (Article 
132). 
 
 37. See GHAI, supra note 36, at 465. 
 38. See id. 
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On the other hand, the quantitatively substantial first category involves 
air services which are to all intents and purposes the sole responsibility 
of the HKSAR government, albeit subject to the proviso that its actions 
should be “under specific authorizations” from the CPG (Article 133).  
All scheduled air services must be regulated by air services agreements 
or provisional accords (i.e., informal agreements).  Within this legal 
framework, the local authorities make concrete decisions with respect to 
the rights of landing or flight over Hong Kong of foreign airlines as well 
as the routes for airlines incorporated in the territory.  There are no 
express constitutional-style provisions for charter or special flights and, 
as was previously the case, the relevant licensing is undertaken by the 
Hong Kong civil aviation administration.39 
This policy pattern, while not devoid of palpable constraints, extends 
in some respects beyond that observed during the colonial era, when the 
territory was considered, at the strategic level, part of the United 
Kingdom for the purposes of international and bilateral air service 
accords, and was deemed to be a source of lucrative business for British 
airlines.  The post-1997 legal architecture does not furnish a mechanism 
whereby mainland airlines could tangibly benefit from the exchange of 
landing rights and scheduled air services in Hong Kong with foreign 
States.  The role of the CPG, both actual and potential, particularly the 
latter, should not be minimized.40  The constitutional arrangements and 
power dynamics may tempt the authorities in Beijing to intervene, but 
there is no solid precedent to suggest this is a realistic prospect.  For the 
foreseeable future, Hong Kong is likely to enjoy a high degree of autonomy 
in tactical and operational matters—coupled with a meaningful, albeit 
not unlimited, measure of strategic independence and corresponding 
obligations.41 
During the early phases of the post-1997 international realignment, 
mainland corporate State and State-influenced interests, notably the 
China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) and Citic Pacific (the 
latter is in fact incorporated in the territory and publicly traded on its 
stock market), sought to build a stake in the two principal Hong Kong 
“designated” airlines, Cathay Pacific and Dragonair. This may have 
constituted an attempt to establish a channel for exercising, directly and 
indirectly, greater control over aviation policy in a capitalist enclave that 
is being reabsorbed into China, yet within a potentially problematic 
loose politico-economic framework, and an industry widely perceived as 
 
 39. See id. at 466. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See Mushkat, Hong Kong’s Exercise of External Autonomy: A Multi-Faceted 
Appraisal, supra note 33. 
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strategic in nature.42  It is thus interesting to note in this context that this 
trend has partly been reversed and that deliberate divestment has 
selectively replaced focused investment as a key corporate goal of the 
players involved.  Cross-border cooperation, primarily between Cathay 
Pacific and Air China, still looms on the agenda, but it has increasingly 
commercial underpinnings that have no overtly adverse implications for 
Hong Kong’s ability to chart its own semi-independent course.43 
An elaborate institutional infrastructure has been erected to sustain 
this historical pattern well into the future—with the Transportation and 
Housing Bureau (THB), the Civil Aviation Department (CAD), and the 
Airport Authority (AA) functioning as its core.  The THB exercises overall 
policy responsibility for civil aviation.  Its principal activities include 
high-level oversight over the work of the CAD, liaison with the AA 
regarding civil aviation-related matters, and the conduct of air services 
negotiations (with the Air Services Division of the CAD playing a supporting 
role). The CAD and AA, the two policy implementing organizational 
arms, are responsible for civil aviation management and for providing, 
operating, maintaining, and developing the HKIA respectively.44 
As matters stand, the AA functions as a government-owned statutory 
corporation subject to terms stated in the Airport Authority Ordinance.  
The board overseeing its activities however comprises non-public 
officers as well as public ones.  Moreover, the AA is legally bound to 
conduct its business according to sound commercial principles.  Indeed, 
its privatization in one form or another may be undertaken in the not too 
distant future.  Private sector participation in the provision of airport 
services has traditionally been widespread and this remains the case 
today.  Further material progress in that direction, which is expected 
soon, barring unforeseen developments, should reinforce Hong Kong’s 
position as a player enjoying considerable autonomy in the aviation 
domain and one capable of employing strategic, as distinct from merely 
tactical and operational, discretion in pursuit of its goals.45 
The latest figures available lend solid support to this conclusion.  They 
show that Hong Kong has thus far signed air services agreements with 
 
 42. See GHAI, supra note 36, at 466. 
 43. See Cathay Pacific Press Release, Hong Kong Strengthens its Role as the 
Premier Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation Hub Under Shareholding Realignment (June 9, 
2006), http://www.cathaypacific.com/cpa/en_INTL/aboutus/pressroomdetails?refID=66b 
7b40b0e0fb010VgnVCM32000011d21c39 (last visited on Jan. 24, 2009). 
 44. See Hong Kong Government, supra note 32. 
 45. See id; Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note 1. 
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fifty-eight different countries across the globe: (Australia, Austria, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, 
Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Vietnam).  Overflight accords 
have also been signed with a number of countries (the Maldives and 
former Soviet Republics such as Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, and 
Ukraine).46 
There is no concrete evidence to suggest such agreements heavily 
draw their inspiration from Beijing, an observation that apparently 
applies, albeit perhaps not to the same extent, with respect to Macau, the 
former Portuguese colony, and as of 1999 another special administrative 
region of the PRC.47  China has been negotiating its air services agreements 
with other parties, where the interests of Hong Kong and Macau are not 
directly involved, in its own way and at times with different consequences.  
Its style in approaching these matters has definitely, and understandably, 
diverged from that of the two special administrative regions.  The gap 
between the final products may have been less pronounced, because air 
services accords inevitably display a certain degree of uniformity in key 
areas, but this does not detract from the fact no full convergence has 
taken place.48 
Plans are formulated to insure that Hong Kong possesses the necessary 
physical, as well as institutional, capabilities to continue progressing 
smoothly along its semi-independent path.  According to the HKIA 2025 
Blueprint, which reflects its long-term goals and corresponding projections, 
the AA is expected to take systematic steps toward establishing a 
seamless network of air, rail, road, and sea links in order to solidify 
HKIA’s role as the pivot of a well-integrated multimode transportation 
system connecting the entire Pearl River Delta region to a wide range of 
 
 46. Hong Kong Government, supra note 32. 
 47. For an overview, see José Tomás Baganha, Macau Civil Aviation and Recent 
Developments in Air Carrier Liability, 28 HONG KONG L.J. 90, 90–103 (1998). 
 48. For an overview, see Gabriel S. Meyer, U.S.-China Aviation Relations: Flight 
Path Toward Open Skies?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427, 427–56 (2002); Alex Burkett, 
China’s Two-Dimensional Skies: The “Chineseness” of Aviation Law in China and How 
it Helps us to Understand Chinese Law, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 251, 251–74 
(2007); Jiangtian Xu, Open Skies Agreement between China and European Union: Paper 
for Intensive Program of Master of Euroculture Program (undated), available at 
http://www.euroculturemaster.org/default.aspx?sec=3&sub=4. 
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international destinations. It is estimated that the HKIA will annually 
serve about 80 million passengers and handle approximately 8 million tons 
of cargo, seeing around 490,000 aircraft movements in the process, in 
2025. The AA and CAD are collaborating closely in an effort to 
maximize the capacity of the existing two runways and the former is 
to embark on a feasibility study focusing on the construction of a third 
one.49 
On the face of it, this is a backdrop conducive to policy boldness, 
flexibility, and innovation.  Given the deeply entrenched laissez-faire 
bureaucratic culture, constitutionally-derived—and arguably rooted in 
international law—scope for autonomous action, impressive financial 
resources, and substantial institutional and physical capabilities, Hong 
Kong should to all appearances bask in the limelight as a pioneer in 
deregulating the aviation industry in general and resolutely embracing 
the open skies architecture in particular.  Yet, as matters stand, the 
territory is accorded scarcely any attention in major studies devoted to 
the liberalization of air services in Asia, where countries not known for a 
single-minded commitment to the neoclassical economic credo feature 
prominently,50 and its adherence to open skies principles, let alone their 
dedicated promotion at home and abroad, has been rather lukewarm.51 
It is a moot point whether Hong Kong should be realistically expected 
to be at the forefront of the movement to deregulate the aviation industry 
in Asia, as distinct from being selectively viewed as a potential model 
for others.  Because of its small size, the domestic market for air services 
is virtually nonexistent and this normally constitutes the principal target 
for liberalization efforts, at least during the initial phases of the 
restructuring process.  By the same token, with some exceptions, the 
territory’s aviation industry has historically not been the subject of tight 
economic regulation, the noneconomic side, including safety, has been 
much more closely managed by the government.  The corollary is that 
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 50. See FLYING HIGH: LIBERALIZING CIVIL AVIATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (Gary C. 
Hufbauer & Christopher Findlay eds., 1996); ASIA PACIFIC AIR TRANSPORT: 
CHALLENGES AND POLICY REFORMS (Christopher Findlay, Chia Lin Sien & Karmjit 
Singh eds., 1997); DIPENDRA SINHA, DEREGULATION AND LIBERALIZATION OF THE 
AIRLINE INDUSTRY: ASIA, EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, AND OCEANIA (2001). 
 51. See KAI-SUN KWONG, TOWARDS OPEN SKIES AND UNCONGESTED AIRPORTS: AN 
OPPORTUNITY FOR HONG KONG (1988); C.K. Law & Raymond Yeung, The Reality of 
“Open Skies” and its Relevance for Hong Kong, Hong Kong Policy Research Institute 
Research Press Briefing, Apr. 5, 2000, http://www.hkpri.org.hk/passagesPDF/policy 
GroupReport/2000/The%20 Reality05April00.pdf. 
MUSHKAT 6/15/2009  9:25:06 AM 
 
406 
the Hong Kong experience perhaps does not provide illuminating 
insights into the challenges posed by the liberalization of air services 
and, for this reason, may have not attracted strong interest on the part of 
policy analysts. 
Such defensive logic cannot be readily applied to strategies directed at 
open skies arrangements. This is a regulatory domain where, in 
principle, ardent proponents of laissez-faire tenets and policies might 
venture beyond the kind of progressive bilateralism emphatically 
preached and selectively practiced by the United States.  A compelling 
argument could be put forth that, irrespective of the paths followed by 
other players in the global aviation arena, Hong Kong should open its 
skies unconditionally.  This would not be tantamount to free entry and 
thus need not conjure up uncomfortable images of disorderly market 
conditions.  There are sophisticated institutional mechanisms for controlling 
access without undermining efficiency, equity, and freedom and the 
local bureaucracy is well-versed in their structural features and has 
acquired considerable experience in operating them.  Notably, landing 
rights can be economically and fairly allocated to airlines via auction in 
a manner similar to the process relied upon in making public land 
commercially available to private property developers in the territory.52 
Designing and implementing a scheme embodying such seemingly 
radical characteristics, while not technically infeasible, may prove to be 
an inherently difficult undertaking, even in a highly favorable politico-
strategic climate.  The possibility that Hong Kong, its apparent neoclassical 
policy mindset notwithstanding, could somehow fall short of being able 
to stretch the prevailing rules that far, effectively abandoning them 
altogether and proceeding in a solo fashion, on a scale that would be 
unprecedented in the aviation industry, should not be ruled out altogether.  
If this were the case, it would still be reasonable to expect the territory to 
adopt a maximalist version of the existing bilateral formula.  After all, 
the content parameters are not rigid and the loose multilateral 
underpinnings of the system leave ample scope for any two countries to 
vary them according to specific interests and circumstances. 
Content is merely one of a number of pivotal elements in the equation.  
Geographic breadth, pace of adoption, and the extent of the initiative 
displayed in the process loom potentially large as well.  The geographic 
network of bilateral accords may be wide or narrow, open skies-type 
innovations may be implemented expeditiously or slowly, and the parties 
involved may exercise leadership in promoting relevant functional 
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frameworks—at home and, more importantly, beyond their borders—or 
opt for a generally passive role.  The geographic breadth factor however 
does not merit further examination here—as distinct from other 
jurisdictional contexts.  It has already been shown that Hong Kong is 
able and willing to enter into bilateral agreements with a truly wide 
range of countries from different parts of the globe and that the elaborate 
network of commercial relationships which it has keenly established is 
highly heterogeneous in nature from a politico-economic perspective. 
On the other hand, pace and initiative, particularly of the regional and 
international variety, is a legitimate issue for critical consideration.  It 
has been previously noted that not all Asian, or, for that matter, European, 
countries have reacted to the American economic liberalization drive at 
roughly the same speed.  New Zealand and Singapore have been singled 
out for being more responsive than others.  By the same token, the open 
skies architecture has been the subject of occasional efforts, which have 
not necessarily borne fruit, to substantially enhance it.  An example of an 
ambitious initiative of this nature is the European Commission’s 
blueprint for a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area (TCAA) which 
“would not simply comprise the standard exchange of rights under open 
skies.  It would also set the stage for negotiating beyond the classic five 
freedoms, and comprise a shared and completely open market environment.53  
The fundamental premise in this context is that, given the overall 
strategic backdrop, Hong Kong should be a fast mover and that, where 
appropriate, it should be at the forefront of such initiatives. 
Yet, other than in terms of geographic breadth, Hong Kong’s 
performance can be said to have fallen short of economically well-
grounded expectations.  Despite strong exhortations to this effect from 
libertarian policy analysts, the territory has not unambiguously opened 
its skies on an indiscriminating basis. Quite the contrary, it has 
consistently favored bilateral arrangements and has vigorously espoused 
their merits.  Suggestions for genuinely market-style unilateral action, 
with no traditional insistence on full reciprocity, have been rejected as 
conceptually dubious and practically flawed.  This attitudinal constellation 
has undergone no palpable transformation in the face of dramatic shifts 
in the global aviation industry and marked changes in local politico-
economic conditions.54  Even China’s gradual embrace of the open 
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skies platform (albeit the bilateral version) has had no ramifications in 
this respect.55 
The second content-related question, whether the prevailing rules of 
the bilateral open skies regime have been fully utilized, must also be 
answered in the negative, although less emphatically so.  On the positive side, 
Hong Kong has effectively dispensed with rigid restrictions requiring 
airlines to be predominantly owned by nationals of the designating State.  
Cathay Pacific, the leading “local” carrier, which has recently acquired 
Dragonair, was founded by an American and an Australian, and has been 
significantly controlled throughout its history by corporate entities with 
British colonial roots (Butterfield & Swire and Swire Pacific).  The Air 
China stake in the airline amounts to merely 17.5% and Swire Pacific, a 
Hong Kong based conglomerate but one that cannot be portrayed as a 
national organizational vehicle, even though its stake in Air China has 
been lifted to 20% following the 2006 realignment, continues to be the 
most prominent shareholder. 
On the negative side, the local government has steadfastly adhered to 
the “one route-one airline” policy, principally in relation to Cathay 
Pacific and Dragonair at relevant junctures.  The underlying argument is 
that, if a certain route is adequately served by an operating airline, opening 
it to another would not be an economically compelling proposition.  The 
reason apparently lies in the fact that this would lead to excess capacity, 
deterioration in airline profitability, erosion of service standards, and 
loss of consumer welfare. The available empirical evidence—obtained 
elsewhere—does not lend solid support to such assertions.  Alternative 
justifications may conceivably be invoked for this purpose, but the 
economic logic relied upon is not entirely sound.  Competitive pressures 
are indeed substantially reduced as a result, yet the consequences, in 
terms of producer efficiency and benefits to the consumer, are less 
favorable than the official line suggests.56 
Nor has the pace of implementation of the open skies platform has 
been particularly impressive. It is not easy to generalize over the relevant 
time period and across the whole geographic spectrum, but at least 
during the initial phases and in key areas, or vis-à-vis major players, 
progress has been distinctly unhurried. The Hong Kong economic 
regime is far more liberal overall than that of the United States and it is 
uncommon for American policy makers to prod their local counterparts 
into laissez-faire style action, yet this has been the pattern on the open 
skies front.  After negotiations between the two sides had dragged on for 
years and had culminated in restrictive accords, former U.S. Secretary of 
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Transportation, Norman Mineta, thus somewhat uncharacteristically 
chose to remind the audience in a speech delivered to the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong on April 19, 2005, that the 
territory would gain more passengers, more commerce, and stronger 
airlines by joining the bilateral open skies tide.57 
The corollary inevitably is that Hong Kong has been a laggard rather 
than a leader in the deregulation of the international aviation industry.  It 
is perhaps unrealistic to expect a relatively small territory not wielding 
sovereign power to be a source of bold initiatives in the global arena, 
other than by example. Opportunities have nevertheless presented 
themselves over the years to exercise leadership in the regional context.  
Libertarian policy analysts have put forth recommendations for simultaneous 
open skies schemes involving a host of Asia-Pacific countries 
(Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and the 
United States) as well as the United Kingdom (by virtue of its position 
vis-à-vis Hong Kong during the colonial era), but these have not been 
systematically pursued.58  Instead, the territory has opted for a low-profile 
approach and has, from time to time, merely perfunctorily welcomed 
steps taken toward open skies elsewhere—notably China. 
This counterintuitive strategic configuration has attracted virtually no 
attention on the part of legal scholars.  Indeed, the study of aviation law 
in Hong Kong—encompassing its descriptive, explanatory, and evaluative 
facets—has largely grounded to a halt in recent years. Economic 
researchers have displayed greater interest in the subject, producing two 
broad-based assessments, typically geared toward the evaluative dimension 
of the topic. The first was undertaken during the early decades of the 
international liberalization era,59 and the second is of a more contemporary 
vintage.60  Reflecting the progressive evolution of policy throughout this 
lengthy period, the former yielded a negative verdict and the latter a 
mixed one.  However, neither has adequately addressed the explanatory 
aspects, nor has shed sufficient light on the persistent gap between “what 
is” (the actual outcomes) and “what ought to be” (the “ideal” outcomes), 
and has even tentatively explored the general theoretical implications of 
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that divergence. These issues are of considerable significance, in the 
local context and beyond, and merit a proper place on the academic 
agenda. 
IV.  QUEST FOR ANALYTICAL EXPLANATION 
There is no dearth of conceptual schemes designed to pinpoint factors 
shaping policy patterns.  Some are intended to be comprehensive in 
nature, encompassing virtually all domains of government activity, and 
others are tailored to circumstances prevailing in specific spheres of 
public sector intervention.61 The ones most pertinent in this context refer 
to regulatory controls rather than all forms of service provision or 
equivalent.  Since regulation is a predominantly domestic function, they 
exhibit a strong “home bias”.  This nevertheless does not materially detract 
from their usefulness, because the lack of a pronounced international 
orientation is not highly inconsistent with extant political realities, or a 
global power constellation characterized by loose supranational controls.  
Moreover, the international perspective, while occupying a peripheral 
position within the overall analytical framework, is by no means 
completely overlooked. 
Several theoretical insights have been generated on the dominant 
domestic side and meaningful efforts have been made to classify them in 
a methodical fashion.  A number of potentially appealing permutations 
are thus available for research purposes.  The one selected here contains 
elements that commonly feature in analytical inquiries into the underpinnings 
of regulatory behavior. Although not exhaustive, it is detailed yet 
parsimonious.  It includes five broad categories: public interest theories, 
interest group theories, private interest theories, force of ideas explanations, 
and institutional theories.62  They are not invariably homogenous and, 
where appropriate, further subdivision may be necessary.  It ought again 
to be emphasized that they are not ideally suited for dissecting regulation 
at the supranational level. This need not pose a serious problem however 
as aviation is subject to a mixture of domestic and bilateral controls.  In 
addition, as indicated, an international conceptual perspective can be 
incorporated into the analytical scheme. 
Public interest theories posit that regulatory activity largely constitutes 
a response to concerns encapsulated in goals mirroring a desire to 
maximize community welfare.  The underlying assumption is that the 
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parties involved are not primarily self-seeking and ultimately function as 
agents for the public interest.  The promotion of parochial objectives is 
not ruled out, yet it is subject to the condition that self-seeking conduct 
must be strictly of the instrumental variety and coincide with—or, better 
still, be subservient to—the pursuit of the public interest (e.g., measures 
to control private activity may at the same time enhance the reelection 
prospects of a politician advocating them and consumer well-being).  To 
state it differently, the embedded preferences for the public interest 
ought to be genuine and terminal.63 
The notion of maximizing collective welfare through government 
channels is fraught with considerable difficulties.  The concept of public 
interest is opaque and cannot be readily managed in the political arena.  
Despite its vagueness and the absence of robust institutional mechanisms 
to facilitate its articulation, it is deemed to be a workable explanatory 
tool which may cautiously be employed in dissecting regulatory behavior.  
The validity of this observation varies from one political setting to 
another.  It applies less effectively to authoritarian polities than liberal 
ones.  The latter provide an institutional environment where, other things 
being equal, agents for the public interest may carry out their fiduciary 
duties, within a principal-agent framework, more faithfully than in a 
nondemocratic milieu resting on fragile legal foundations.64 
In authoritarian settings, the common good is typically equated with 
the particularistic, paternalistic, or personal preferences of a specific 
individual, group or organization, or system.  However, this does not imply 
that in liberal ones it invariably assumes the form of national/social 
goals which unambiguously supersede private interests.  It may be the 
product of political balancing (featuring the simultaneous fulfillment of 
key facets of different particularistic aspirations), elaborate compromise 
(whereby particularistic agendas are scaled back in order to attain a measure 
of collective equilibrium), and strategic tradeoff (involving tangible 
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concessions to particularistic interests but also concrete sacrifices on 
their part, an inherently problematic combination yet one that allows 
progress toward a target selectively embodying the characteristics of the 
common good).65 
To complicate matters, perceptions of the public interest are often 
shaped by forces originating outside the regulatory arena.  According to 
the external-signal theory, institutions charged with serving the common 
good struggle to come to grips with it because of its elusive nature.  
Consequently, they observe the responses to their decisions by other 
parties and draw inferences about the correspondence between these 
decisions and the hard-to-grasp concept of the public interest.  The 
relevant parties in such circumstances may include the judiciary, the 
legislature, segments of the executive branch, pressure groups, professional 
associations, the scientific community, networks of technical experts, the 
media, constituents, and the public-at-large.  Academic-style research 
selectively conducted by such parties may play a role in helping to 
crystallize the notion of the common good.66 
For the most part, the idea of the public interest does not loom large in 
theories primarily focused on the impact of pressure or interest group 
activity on regulatory outcomes.  Such conceptual schemes tend to place 
the emphasis on competition for power among groups with divergent 
objectives, rather than public spiritedness in one form or another, as the 
key determinant of policy evolution.  Certain variants are not entirely 
inconsistent with the balancing, compromise, or even tradeoff offshoots 
of public interest theories, but they are generally tilted further away from 
the idea of common good.  These and other variants which fall into that 
broad category range from open-ended pluralism to narrow-based 
corporatism.  The former centers on the competitive interplay between 
diverse elements in the political arena and the latter focuses on the 
selective partnership between the State and prominent corporate entities 
from which non-participants are to all intents and purposes excluded.67 
Private interest theories of regulation dispense with the notion of the 
common good altogether.  They are predicated on the assumption that 
policy is driven by private interests rather than their public or group 
counterparts, although the distinction between private and group elements at 
times becomes blurred in the process of analytical elaboration.  The non-
embracement or abandonment of the common good ideal is believed to 
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be the result of goal deflection in regulatory agencies.  Such bodies are 
normally established in order to correct market failure—rooted, for 
example, in public goods, externalities, asymmetric information, moral 
hazard, deviations from perfect competition, distributive anomalies—
and insure a close alignment between private initiative and community 
welfare.  For various reasons, however, this mission is not pursued in 
earnest from inception or undergoes significant erosion over time.  As a 
consequence, the regulatory agenda is skewed in favor of private 
interests.68 
One explanation offered in this context is that agencies engaged in 
regulation are in fact set up at the behest of producers in the private 
sector, individual corporations or corporate networks, rather than to 
promote the common good, cartel theory.  A complementary perspective 
suggests that the initial intentions of organizational architects are 
honorable, but that State organs are inherently vulnerable to being 
effectively taken over by special interests, capture theory.  This may 
sound counterintuitive, yet regulation may yield tangible benefits for 
producers.  Among other things, it may protect them by introducing 
shared rules for corporate behavior and, like cartelization, foster institutional 
forms that diffuse competitive pressures (e.g., restrict entry, pave way 
for concentration of market power, and provide scope for price 
manipulation).  This argument is not without Marxist foundations, but it 
is developed within a Chicago-style neoclassical framework.69 
If such theoretical propositions are valid, they cast doubt on the 
consumer protection hypothesis underlying conceptual schemes that 
accord primacy to the public interest.  According to this viewpoint, 
whatever their avowed purpose, regulatory agencies do little in practice 
to protect consumers.  Adopting the perversion hypothesis, or asserting 
that in reality the common good is perverted in the public-private arena, 
may stretch this logic to uncomfortable extremes.  A more accurate 
reflection is furnished by the no-effect hypothesis, claiming that regulation 
generates no gains for the community but is a costly undertaking, and its 
producer protection counterpart, postulating that, contrary to expectations, 
the actual outcome of regulation is an environment supportive of 
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uncompetitive business practices attractive to well-entrenched producers.70 
Private influences on regulation need not originate outside the public 
sector.  Political economists also contend that organizations and officials 
directly engage in the process may be regarded, for analytical purposes, 
as self-focused enterprises and entrepreneurs, respectively. At the 
organizational level, this may manifest itself in the pursuit of objectives 
geared toward enhancing the interests of the regulatory agency rather 
than community welfare, the organization in this case is public, but the 
interests impinging on the performance of its functions—for example, 
agency-specific budget maximization—qualify as private. At the individual 
level, similar behavioral patterns may be discerned. Regulators may thus 
seek to improve their reelection, if politicians, or career, if bureaucrats,  
prospects instead of channeling their energies into the formulation and 
implementation of strategies conducive to the common good.71   
Like their public interest counterparts, private interest theories of 
regulation are not without their critics who express misgivings about the 
conceptual underpinnings and empirical fit to behavioral realities. The 
concerns voiced have to a degree shifted the politico-economic agenda 
in a slightly different and less ambitious direction by giving rise to agency 
theories, also referred to as post-revisionist accounts. Such perspectives 
primarily center on the problems encountered in exercising regulatory 
control over organizations and individuals.  They are typically couched 
in microeconomic terms, often revolving around the notion of 
transaction costs.  The emergence of this trend, which may be portrayed 
as complementary rather than competing, should not materially detract 
from the effectiveness of private interest theories of regulation as a 
stylized analytical tool capable of selectively yielding illuminating 
conceptual insights.72 
Force of ideas explanations of policy development give prominence to 
intellectual conceptions “which express how and why the government 
ought to control business.”73  This time-honored notion is not always 
rigorously formulated, but it continues to be widely shared.  It was 
vibrantly stated by Keynes, the founding father of modern macroeconomics, 
who emphatically opined that the “ideas of economists and political 
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philosophers . . . are more powerful than is commonly understood.  
Indeed the world is ruled by little else.”74 This seemingly innocuous 
proposition came to haunt him when his own notions regarding the 
public regulation of private enterprise came under relentless attack by 
neoclassical economists and unsympathetic policy makers in the 1980’s.  
Today, it is perhaps most effectively encapsulated in the concept of 
loquocentric societies where ideas, if deployed persuasively, may 
prompt people to act in a manner not entirely consistent with their 
narrow interests.75 
Some academic commentators voice skepticism with respect to the 
force of the ideas themselves, or their content, and are inclined to 
attribute the impact to packaging.  For example, McCloskey cites 
cynical witticisms circulating in the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 
in the 1980’s, which reflect misgivings of “insider” economists about the 
notion that policy is the product of scientific experiments of the hard-
science variety: “Mankiw’s Maxim: No issue in economics has even 
been decided on the basis of facts. Nihilistic Corollary I: No issue has 
ever been decided on the basis of theory either.”76  He proceeds to argue 
that persuasiveness in economics does not hinge on empirical or logical 
rigor.  Rather, it stems from the ability to successfully employ crucial 
rhetorical skills in the appropriate political context and thus enhance the 
appeal of essentially contestable arguments.77 
Institutional theories of regulation veer even further away from the 
concept of interest, whether public or private.  Their proponents assert 
that policies are embedded in complex organizational structures which 
are governed by a plethora of behavior constraining and determining 
substantive and procedural rules.  The scope for consistently maximizing 
the common good or one’s utility in such settings is distinctly limited.  
The same holds true for striking intergroup bargains.  The rule-bound 
structures evolve slowly over time and are shaped by a multitude of 
factors, including ones highly macroscopic in nature (e.g., culture).  The 
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different strands of institutionalism, whether cultural, historical, organizational, 
socio-legal, sociological, and a neo-institutional variant, mirror this 
diversity.  The corollary is that gaining deep insight into the relevant 
structural and functional dimensions of the broad organizational 
architecture is a precondition for coming to grips with the intricacies of 
the regulatory process.78 
The international side of the picture has been explored in a more 
selective and tentative fashion.  As indicated, this pattern has its roots in 
a configuration characterized by domestic initiative and supranational 
fragility.  The global aviation system is not atypical in this respect in that 
it is based on a negotiated order, and a bilateral one to boot.  Three 
distinct approaches have emerged in this space: the Grenoble regulation 
school, the Parisian regulation school, and the American international 
regime school.  They tend however to be preoccupied with level-of-
analysis issues—productive system, nation State, or supranational 
entities—definitional matters, and structural and functional questions 
that are not firmly linked to theories of regulatory development.  One 
notable exception to the norm is the recourse for explanatory purposes to 
the concepts of hegemonic power, exercised by the dominant nation 
State, and hegemonic stability associated with it.  Both may shed light 
on the dynamics of regulation in the global economic arena and the 
modus operandi of players who inhabit it.79 
The twin theories of hegemonic power and hegemonic stability 
provide a logical starting point for endeavoring to explain the evolution 
of Hong Kong’s open skies strategy.  The global aviation system can 
scarcely be portrayed as a level playing field. It has been unambiguously 
dominated by the United States during the entire modern era.  It has also 
been remarkably stable overall at the macro level.  Superior American 
economic power, reinforced by robust political leadership, has been a 
major source of cohesion, albeit in a form not necessarily universally 
welcome.  U.S. aviation policies have not fluctuated widely because the 
underlying intellectual climate has undergone few material changes.  
Reformist ideas have exerted great influence at critical junctures, but 
there have been just two clearly discernible paradigm shifts since the 
early twentieth century. The Great Depression experience paved the way 
for Keynesian-style tight control of private enterprise and perceived 
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interventionist excesses provoked a libertarian backlash culminating in 
the emergence of the deregulation movement in the late 1970’s. 
Stability should not be equated with a steady state.  Gradual structural 
and functional transformation, falling short of a complete metamorphosis, 
has been a common feature of system adaptation.  Force of ideas accounts 
may not elucidate it fully.  Berstein, for example, has resorted to life-
cycle theory, predominantly of the private interest variety, in order to 
shed analytical light on the slow erosion of common good-oriented 
values in the face of capture-like pressures in the period extending from 
the 1930’s to the 1950’s.  According to him, regulation inevitably progresses 
through the following stages: gestation (concerns with market failure 
lead to the creation of a regulatory agency), youth (the inexperienced 
regulatory agency is outmaneuvered bythe regulatees but is sustained by 
a crusading zeal), maturity (political support for agency objectives 
diminishes and devitalization sets in; needs of industry begin to take 
precedence over those of the community), and old age (symptoms of 
atrophy proliferate and private interests become paramount).80  Such 
microscopic changes however need not significantly detract from the 
stability of the system. 
It may be argued that, in an environment dominated by a large and 
assertive hegemon, and one not susceptible to notable structural and 
functional shifts over the short term horizon, small and resource-poor, in 
the sense of not being able to effectively employ politico-economic 
leverage in the global arena, players like Hong Kong may not enjoy 
sufficient scope for displaying strategic initiative and may not have the 
incentive to do so, given the system’s inherent stability.  This may partly 
explain the territory’s reactive posture regarding the open skies project.  
Opportunistic adaptation seems a more realistic option than active leadership 
in those circumstances.  It would probably be unproductive—in light of 
the prevailing constraints, limited opportunities, and competing goals—to 
proactively pursue that otherwise apparently appealing liberal idea on a 
substantial geographic scale. 
In recent years, a trend toward regionalization of the open skies 
blueprint has emerged because of the difficulties posed by a quantum 
leap beyond bilateralism at the global level, the Transatlantic Common 
Aviation Area plan is merely one manifestation of this phenomenon.  
Hong Kong could have thus exhibited greater initiative in the Asian 
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context.  It is a moot point of course whether it would have been 
possible to leave the United States out of the regional picture as aviation 
challenges on that front are normally addressed in broader Asia-Pacific 
rather than narrower Asian terms.  The hegemonic factor is again not 
entirely irrelevant here.  Its explanatory power nevertheless is more 
modest and other conceptual schemes, taking into account the China 
shadow and domestic influences, may need to be relied upon for this 
purpose.  After all, in both the global and regional domains, indeed, even 
the strictly bilateral ones, Hong Kong has displayed less individual and 
collective determination than New Zealand and Singapore, for example. 
Public officials would doubtless claim, and not without certain 
justification, that they have been primarily seeking to serve the common 
good rather than passively adapting to stimuli originating from external 
sources.  There are numerous conceptions of the public interest.  Mitnick 
has identified a number of dimensions allowing to systematically 
classify them and has constructed a complex but workable typology on 
this basis.81  In terms of some of the key criteria that he has suggested, 
the notion of the common good implicitly espoused by Hong Kong 
policy makers in this instance is probably combinatorial, there exist 
multiple sets of preferences for a course of action; the search for the 
public interest entails selecting a combination from those sets, a mixture 
of impositional and moderately consensual—instead of being the 
product of elaborate consensus building or pluralistic aggregation; 
impositional is more appropriate adjective than dictatorial because Hong 
Kong practices limited democracy which continues to be underpinned by 
British-style common law—and rule determined—the handful of 
participants involved in the process of effectively defining the public 
interest follow a set of well-defined procedures; the outcome is deemed 
to be consistent with the common good. To the extent that the 
consensual aspects reflect the general views of a specific group, such as 
economic researchers, engineering experts, and legal commentators, 
instead of the community-at-large, there may be scope for incorporating 
them in a less ambiguous fashion into the public interest equation. 
Lawyers paint a largely favorable picture, albeit one that needs to be 
updated.82  At the technical end of the analytical spectrum, scarcely any 
strategic assessments have been offered by members of the engineering 
profession, they may have been more active at the tactical and 
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operational level, albeit not in public forums, but not necessarily from an 
overtly critical perspective.  This may be construed as an indication of 
tacit approval.  It should be noted however that legal scholars and 
practitioners who have addressed the subject in a rigorous fashion in the 
Hong Kong context have mostly confined themselves to the noneconomic 
facets of regulation.83  This particular side of the topic has been explored 
by economists alone.  Overall, they initially adopted a negative tone yet, 
as the regulatory regime has assumed a more flexible and sophisticated 
form, their observations have shifted in a generally positive direction.84  
The specific open skies component of the system has nevertheless 
remained a bone of contention, producing divergent responses.85 
Those who provide their seal of qualified approval emphasize the 
seemingly distinctive features of the aviation industry.  It is characterized by 
an undifferentiated product which is highly perishable, ease of entry, 
tendency toward monopoly or oligopoly, ease of entry notwithstanding, 
growth rate exceeding by a substantial margin that witnessed in many 
other industries, high capital intensity—which becomes more pronounced 
over time; labor intensity, on the other hand, diminishes—economies of 
scale/scope/density, network externalities, product externalities, strong 
locational influences, homogeneous production technology, greater-than- 
usual financial vulnerability, airlines often receive earlier-ordered aircraft/ 
boost capacity before demand/traffic materializes on a corresponding 
scale, considerable sensitivity to changes in business cycle conditions, 
and elevated debt/equity ratios.  Such features to all appearances selectively 
militate against fast-paced and far-reaching liberalization.86 
From a public interest perspective, some economists have taken the 
position—broadly consistent with the loosely articulated government 
stance—that the aviation industry is of fundamental strategic importance 
for the highly open and resource-poor Hong Kong economy. The 
corollary is that its distinctive characteristics should loom large on the 
regulatory agenda and impart a degree of caution to decisions relating to 
market structure and conduct.  This is particularly true with respect to 
issues at the heart of the open skies strategy such as the unilateral 
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opening of the market and the one route-one airline configuration.  The 
starting point in the multistep argument focuses on network and product 
externalities.  Given the widespread reliance on hub-and-spoke facilities, 
an additional route confers external benefits on members of an existing 
network and new entrants, network externalities.  By the same token, 
cargo and passenger services are complementary products in the aviation 
industry, product externalities.  Airlines thus endeavor to enhance their 
performance by attaining an optimal mix of cargo and passengers via 
hub operations.  In such an environment, rapid and wholesale liberalization 
could have a very uneven impact on existing market participants and 
new entrants.  Uncertainty might rise significantly as a consequence, 
potentially eroding in the long run the strength of Hong Kong “designated” 
or “home” carriers and the territory’s status as a thriving aviation hub.87 
The “home” carrier-aviation hub synergies are deemed to be considerable 
in this context.  This stems from the fact that a healthy home carrier is 
the ideal vehicle for expanding the trunk routes and extending the air 
services network for the hub.  Such an operator is a particularly valuable 
instrument for building cross-border airline and aviation alliances.  
Further, a strong home carrier, with headquarters located at its domestic 
base, has much more pronounced linkage and multiplier effects on the 
local economy than foreign operators.  In addition, from a national 
security viewpoint, it can insure a stable supply of air services for the 
hub at delicate junctures (e.g., when external pressures in one form or 
another may bring about a disruption).  Last but not least, a home carrier 
is a source of prestige for the hub, an admittedly intangible but by no 
means worthless politico-economic commodity, especially for a global 
metropolis lacking sovereign power and unambiguous identity.88 
Another major claim put forth in support of the cautionary thesis is 
that both sequential and simultaneous liberalization of the cargo and 
passenger markets could prove problematic, albeit in different ways.  
These two markets are heterogeneous, but they employ a homogeneous 
production technology.  The former is much less controlled by local 
carriers in Hong Kong than is the case elsewhere in Asia.  It would be 
the first candidate for unilateral liberalization, if such a strategic shift 
materialized.  The benefits would accrue to users of cargo services, yet 
passengers might be adversely affected.  Moreover, the gains could prove 
transitory as a handful of foreign mega carriers might sooner or later 
emerge as the dominant players in the market.  A unilateral opening of 
Hong Kong’s skies along the entire product spectrum could benefit 
certain classes of passengers (e.g., those flying economy) yet not others 
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(e.g., those flying business).  It might also lead to deterioration in the 
operational efficiency and service quality of the home carriers.89 
The seemingly controversial one route-one airline policy is portrayed 
in a similar vein.  While it does not comfortably accord with the theory 
of contestable markets, practical experience generally vindicates it.  
Specifically, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have followed 
the same path and their record suggests that effective competition 
between domestic airlines operating internationally can be maintained 
within this framework.  Such a structural pattern may also be conducive 
to the development of a unified, as distinct from fragmented, aviation 
network. It is further asserted that the commercial performance of 
Cathay Pacific, the principal home carrier, has not been sufficiently 
exceptional to infer that the somewhat conservative approach, from a 
standard economic perspective, toward the evolving open skies platform 
has been materially shaped by other than public interest considerations.90 
This view however is not universally shared across the professional 
spectrum and may be selectively challenged.91  The home carrier-hub 
synergies, the likely fallout from unilateral liberalization, and the 
attractions of the one route-one airline policy appear to be overstated.  
The analysis seems to be tilted toward the producer side and may reflect 
greater concern for stability, perhaps understandably so in the uncertain 
Hong Kong political context, than other strategic values—including 
dynamic, as distinct from static, efficiency.  The long-term benefits 
to consumers of a radical overhaul may not be accorded sufficient 
attention and different classes of customers (e.g., those flying economy 
versus those flying business) are treated equally.  The possibility of 
realizing the advantages of far-reaching (albeit not necessarily fast-
paced) liberalization, while largely avoiding the negative side-effects 
via innovative regulatory means not currently relied upon, is not 
seriously explored.  The assumption that policy is inspired by 
perceptions of the common good, as well as underpinned by “correct” 
administrative procedures, need not been discarded, but additional 
theoretical insights are required. 
Pressure group activity may not provide further illumination.  
Transportation is a vital and heavily politicized (by local standards) 
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sphere of economic activity in Hong Kong.92  Politicization nevertheless 
seldom meaningfully extends beyond the road and rail segments of the 
sector.  The air and water components, which impinge less decisively on 
the daily living of the grassroots community, have been subject to 
relatively modest bottom-up influences.  The government has thus been 
able to proceed in a comparatively autonomous fashion and employ a 
predominantly managerial, as distinct from a political, which involves 
complex balancing, compromises, and tradeoffs, style. Decisions relating to 
strategic aviation issues cannot be described as merely the product of—
externally-constrained, where appropriate—technical deliberations, sound 
or otherwise.  They are imbued with political undertones, yet ones more 
consonant with the private interest and institutional theoretical perspectives. 
Hong Kong has been portrayed, favorably for the most part, as a 
minimalist “State”.93  This expression conjures up images of a detached 
Weberian-style bureaucracy mechanically performing a handful of 
Smithian-type functions absolutely essential to the smooth operations of 
the private market.  Indeed, it was none other than Friedman, the founding 
father of modern monetarism and a prominent exponent of the Chicago 
School of economics, who has depicted the territory as the last bastion of 
the laissez-faire intellectual tradition and sympathetically likened it to a 
night-watchman State: 
Hong Kong has no tariffs or other restraints on international trade. . . .  It has no 
government direction of economic activity, no minimum wage laws, no fixing of 
prices. . . .  Government plays an important, [but limited, role]. . . .  It enforces 
law and order, provides a means for formulating the rules of conduct, adjudicates 
disputes, facilitates transportation and communication, and supervises the 
issuance of currency.94 
Policy realities have never conformed fully to this stylized textbook 
portrait and the divergence has grown more pronounced over time, although 
not to a point rendering the portrait completely obsolete.  The minimalist 
State has proved itself capable of succumbing to interventionist 
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impulses and being drawn into the socio-political cauldron.95  Moreover, 
its responses have not invariably followed a “neutral” path.  The cultivated 
sense of bureaucratic detachment has always been something of an 
illusion as the administrative elite has chosen to ally itself closely with 
its business counterpart throughout the colonial era and beyond.  This 
pattern has been carefully and credibly documented by Goodstadt, an 
astute observer of the Hong Kong politico-economic scene and a 
strategically-positioned government insider, former Head of the Central 
Policy Unit.96  The picture he has painted suggests that the minimalist 
State has consistently displayed strong corporatist tendencies.97 
The decisive and wholesale liberalization of the telecommunications 
sector is often cited as an example of bureaucratic distance from 
business and willingness to undertake structural reforms costly for 
entrenched corporate interests.  As a consequence of this strategic 
initiative, a distinctly monopolistic configuration has given way to an 
unambiguously fragmented one.  Consumers have reaped the benefits in 
terms of product diversity, price, and quality.  Such examples however 
are few and far between.  In some key industries, the minimalist State 
has been content to countenance, and even encourage, a high concentration 
of market power and uncompetitive practices.98  Moreover, the circumstances 
which precipitated the revamping were somewhat unique from a 
political perspective99 and the status quo was becoming technologically 
untenable.100  The persistent reluctance to contemplate ,until recently, a 
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modern-style competition law is indicative of an enduring determination 
to preserve a modicum of big business privileges.101 
Trends in the aviation domain have not materially deviated from this 
pattern.  The colonial regime had exhibited an unmistakable bias in favor 
of British Airways (BA), perhaps under subtle pressure from London, 
and it had otherwise been gently protective of the home carrier 
(Cathay Pacific).102  It is apparent that its post-1997 counterpart has gone to 
considerable lengths not to erode the latter’s margin of advantage.103  
This may not amount to a full-scale, Chicago-type capture, and the 
strategy may even include an element of the public interest, however 
defined.  Yet, it is a reflection of a deliberate corporatist orientation, 
which has deep historical roots and manifests itself in a number of 
pivotal spheres of economic activity.  A unilateral opening of Hong 
Kong’s skies and parallel initiatives could prove highly disruptive for 
the generally profitable and stable home carrier, far more so than for the 
hub, from a long-term perspective.  That doubtlessly is an additional 
factor in the complex regulatory equation. 
A host of institutional influences may also impinge on decisions relating 
to the open skies platform, some possibly in a meaningful fashion.  It 
should thus be noted that a minimalist State is not necessarily a 
reformist one.  An innate conservatism, coupled with a strong penchant 
for not tinkering with time-honored simple rules governing organizational 
behavior, tends to breed a degree of strategic inertia.  The powerful 
deregulation tide in the latter part of the twentieth century had its origins 
in maximalist settings (e.g., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, and the United States) even though it was triggered by forces 
selectively driven by minimalist values.  The Hong Kong bureaucracy 
has been traditionally content to adopt a passive posture and respond to 
impulses emanating from other segments of the politico-economic and 
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socio-political arenas, predominantly relying on outside rather than 
inside initiation.104 
Moreover, its receptivity to external signals, a concept featuring in 
regulatory theory, may be portrayed as limited. The governmental 
decision-making machinery is supported by an extensive network of 
advisory committees with substantial scope for private sector participation, 
but not leadership.  In addition, independent consultants are employed in 
order to provide strategic or tactical illuminations.  The selection process 
however is closely controlled by the bureaucracy and so is the working 
agenda, particularly at the strategic level.105  The Hong Kong Center for 
Economic Research, a libertarian organization drawing its intellectual 
inspiration from Chicago sources, has been issuing analytical reports 
advocating radical liberalization across wide swathes of industrial 
activity, including air transportation which do not overlook the open 
skies issue.106  However, these reports have seldom provoked a serious 
official reaction, and that cannot be attributed just to the overly academic 
packaging. 
Another institutional factor which may be relevant in this context is 
regulatory goal deflection stemming from organization-specific structural 
influences, with functional ramifications, rather than economic pressures 
(i.e., cartelization, capture, and individual versus collective utility-
maximization).  In Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, particularly the United States, 
lawyers often constitute the key professional element in regulatory 
agencies.  By virtue of their training and experience, and consequently 
values and priorities set, they tend to place greater emphasis on process-
focused objectives than outcome-oriented ones.107  Goal deflection is the 
upshot.  A similar phenomenon may be observed in Hong Kong, where 
generalists, referred to as administrative officers, dominate the top layers 
of the bureaucratic pyramid.  They display lawyer-like qualities and, for 
better or for worse, their modus operandi may slow the wheels of the 
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regulatory engine.108  Interestingly, in “Communist” China too, generalists 
have traditionally dictated policy direction, with technocrats gaining 
ascendancy when decisive problem management has been required.109 
It may be further argued that the post-1997 institutional environment 
is not conducive to regulatory innovation, particularly in policy domains 
involving relations with foreign jurisdictions.  The transition from British to 
Chinese rule may have not been abrupt, but the local bureaucracy, 
apparently somewhat inward-looking and static in its attitudinal disposition, 
may have not been sufficiently prepared and adequately equipped to 
effectively confront the external challenges likely to emerge within the 
politically more complex “One Country, Two Systems,” or “Greater 
China, organizational framework.  The gap between strategic expectations 
embedded in the new reality, or the sheer magnitude of the task facing 
the post-1997 policy makers, and institutional capabilities may have 
induced a degree of caution, or a systematic preference for risk avoidance 
rather than risk taking.”110 The lack of strategic predictability and 
transparency on the Chinese side111 may have compounded the uncertainty 
and may have reinforced the conservative bias.112 
This theme has been brought into sharp focus by one of Hong Kong’s 
leading political scientists.  In a series of trenchant studies, he has 
highlighted the growing institutional convergence between the territory 
and China.113  Other researchers have focused on the increasing economic 
integration, particularly in the Pearl River Delta context, and the positive 
spillovers accruing to the two parties, without suggesting that a marked 
 
 108. For an overview, see Burns, supra note 105; Scott, supra note 105; MIRON 
MUSHKAT, THE MAKING OF THE HONG KONG ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS (1982); THE HONG 
KONG CIVIL SERVICE: PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PRACTICES (Ian Scott & John P. Burns 
eds., 1984); THE HONG KONG CIVIL SERVICE AND ITS FUTURE (Ian Scott & John P. Burns 
eds., 1988); HONG KONG IN TRANSITION: THE HANDOVER YEARS (Robert Ash et al. eds., 
2000). 
 109. For an overview, see VICTOR C. SHIH, FACTIONS AND FINANCE IN CHINA: ELITE 
CONFLICT AND INFLATION (2008). 
 110. See Mushkat, Hong Kong’s Exercise of External Autonomy: A Multi-Faceted 
Appraisal, supra note 33. 
 111. For an overview, see KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY 
MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES (1988); HUANG JIANRONG, 
THE APPLICABILITY OF POLICY-MAKING THEORIES IN POST-MAO CHINA (1999); THE 
MAKING OF CHINESE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE ERA OF REFORM (David M. 
Lampton ed., 2001); SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER (2007). 
 112. See Mushkat, Hong Kong’s Exercise of External Autonomy: A Multi-Faceted 
Appraisal, supra note 33. 
 113. See Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, The Mainlandization and Recolonization of Hong 
Kong: A Triumph of Convergence over Divergence with Mainland China, in THE HONG 
KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION IN ITS FIRST DECADE, supra note 92, at 179–231; 
SONNY SHIU-HING LO, GOVERNING HONG KONG: LEGITIMACY, COMMUNICATION AND 
POLITICAL DECAY (2002); SONNY SHIU-HING LO, THE DYNAMICS OF BEIJING-HONG 
KONG RELATIONS: A MODEL FOR TAIWAN (2008). 
MUSHKAT 6/15/2009  9:25:06 AM 
[VOL. 10:  381, 2009]  Open Skies 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 427 
(as distinct from modest) erosion of autonomy has taken place, thus 
leaving the local organizational façade largely intact. By contrast, Lo has 
likened the whole process to one of mainlandization and recolonization.  
According to him, Hong Kong has become economically dependent on 
China and deferential toward the central government in key spheres of 
socio-political activity. This has inevitably affected its institutional 
landscape, both structurally and functionally.114  One does not need to 
assume that the thesis is fully valid to conclude that regulatory innovation 
in an area impinging on mainland interests, including those of its 
budding airlines, and having global or regional ramifications, would be 
perceived as a risky enterprise by local policy makers. 
This trend, whether firmly grounded in organizational reality or somewhat 
overstated, may have implications for strategic initiatives falling short of 
complete liberalization.  There is some scope, for example, for enhancing 
Asian cooperation without direct American participation.  This reflects 
the fact that the bilateral accords between countries in the region and the 
United States are generally more progressive than those among 
themselves.  The reluctance to liberalize them even further by granting, 
for instance, unlimited Seventh Freedom rights or change of gauge rights 
to American carriers apparently stems from the belief that this might 
pave the way for their domination of Asian aviation markets.  In such 
circumstances, it would be logical for countries in the region, particularly 
those enjoying substantial locational advantages, to solidify mutual 
commercial relationships and forge more progressive agreements.  This 
could boost the competitiveness of Asian airlines.115  Hong Kong might 
be expected, in a low-key fashion if necessary, to take the first steps in 
that direction but, rather typically from a post-1997 perspective,116 has 
thus far refrained from pursuing the less ambitious regional cooperation 
option. 
Cross-border institutional convergence, whose degree cannot be 
reliably ascertained, has coincided with additional cohesion-sapping 
developments in the political environment in which the regulatory 
machinery is embedded.  Progress has nevertheless been transformed as 
the legislature, fledgling parties, pressure groups, and civil society—
including the vociferous media—have gained greater prominence, which 
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 115. See Law & Yeung, supra note 51. 
 116. See Mushkat, Hong Kong’s Exercise of External Autonomy: A Multi-Faceted 
Appraisal, supra note 33. 
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should not be necessarily equated with tangible influence.  Executive-led 
government remains entrenched, yet in a political setting characterized 
by growing checks and balances, and where the exercise of executive 
power has evolved into a far more challenging undertaking than in the 
heyday of the colonial era.117  This has been accompanied by increasing 
institutional fragmentation.  Indeed, it has been noted that the political 
system has become “disarticulated”.  Specifically, given that the entire 
structure amounts to “neither parliamentary fish nor presidential fowl, 
the executive, the bureaucracy and the legislature (which is divided 
within itself) each pursue their own agendas, punctuated by occasional 
skirmishes on the boundaries of their domains and by subterranean 
campaigns to extend their jurisdictions.”118 
The colonial era had witnessed at least three “crises of legitimacy”, 
although their degree is equally difficult to reliably ascertain.  However, 
they proved relatively short-lived and containing them had not posed a 
formidable problem.119  The crisis of legitimacy stemming from the 
transition from British to Chinese rule has been more prolonged and less 
amenable to strategies of containment.  Government performance has 
also deteriorated during the post-1997 period and Chinese actions have 
at times undermined local confidence.120  This has resulted in a persistent 
erosion of trust in the policy machinery, reinforcing the adverse effects 
of institutional fragmentation.121  In such a fragile organizational setting, 
regulatory quantum leaps in general, other than in special local circumstances, 
and with respect to the open skies platform in particular may be well 
beyond the realm of feasibility.  Influences of this nature ought arguably 
to be taken into consideration when dissecting the global legal 
architecture. 
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 118. Ian Scott, The Disarticulation of Hong Kong’s Post-Handover Political 
System, 43 CHINA J. 29, 29–53 (2000). 
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V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
The fact versus value controversy is a tip of the slippery analytical 
iceberg.  Underlying it are intense disagreements between members of 
different schools of thought (e.g., objectivists and subjectivists, realists 
and constructivists) as to what qualifies as true or false and good or evil.  
Neither the law nor the social sciences can avoid this intellectually 
treacherous territory—indeed, it would be inappropriate for researchers 
operating in those academic domains to bypass that uncomfortable 
terrain in a cavalier fashion.  For practical purposes, it may nevertheless 
be convenient, or even legitimate, to assume that the two intertwined 
concepts can be clinically uncoupled in order to exclusively focus on one 
or the other.  This Article is thus not without sympathy for the libertarian 
vision from which Hong Kong is assumed to draw its inspiration (albeit 
not unambiguously) but its principal purpose is to provide an empirically- 
based explanation rather than engage in strict normative evaluation. 
Factually-driven analytical accounts may not be the mainstay of 
traditional legal scholarship and the “hard” social sciences, yet they can 
scarcely be portrayed as a peripheral phenomenon.  The picture varies 
from one academic sub-discipline to another, but such accounts feature 
prominently in the fields of contemporary international law and 
international political economy, to the extent that international law and 
international relations overlap, the latter has long displayed a strong 
empirical and analytical orientation.  Rather than treating this explanatory 
survey as a stand-alone case study, it may thus be desirable to place the 
findings in a broader theoretical context.  The open skies platform, while 
loosely structured, has the attributes of a legal regime or international legal 
regime,122 a factually-grounded analytical construct.  The corollary is 
that the Hong Kong experience in that respect may furnish additional 
insights into a concept whose empirical roots do not materially extend 
beyond American and European territory. 
Its loose structure notwithstanding, the open skies platform occupies a 
relatively high place in the hierarchy of international regimes.  It is a 
diverse platform with weak multilateral underpinnings.  Some of its 
components have not evolved beyond the constellation that prevailed 
 
 122. A regime is a set of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision 
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given [issue-area].”  
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prior to the partial deregulation of the international aviation industry and 
others have by no means seen exponential progress.  Yet, it is a formal 
legal platform governed by explicit sovereign, or equivalent, commitments, 
even if predominantly bilateral in nature.  It does not just substantively 
differ from regimes which are anchored in implicit undertakings, often 
possessing significant practical ramifications, but can be said to be 
technically “superior” (without necessarily being “better”) to them.  The 
implication is that Hong Kong’s adaptation to this moving platform may 
shed further theoretical light on the functioning of international legal 
regimes rather than merely forms of patterned interstate behavior, which 
in itself should not be automatically equated with customary international 
law.123 
Such formal systems and their informal counterparts are multidimensional 
entities.  Legal researchers and social scientists have principally focused 
on two facets: regime origins and persistence.  Their ideas have followed 
three theoretically divergent paths: realist/neorealist, liberal/neoliberal, 
and cognitivist.  They do however loosely share at least one common 
crucial assumption: their work is based on the fundamental premise that 
international regimes are an essentially effective antidote to international 
anarchy.  The analytical gap between the realist and liberal conceptual 
schemes is less wide than that separating them and the cognitivist 
edifice, the latter is an academically well established school of thought, 
and it would thus be inappropriate to portray it as nonmainstream, but it 
is of a relatively recent vintage and its policy impact has been distinctly 
more modest. 
State power looms large in realist discourse and, importantly in this 
context, so do its unequal distribution and ramifications thereof for 
system performance.  International regimes are thought to be dominated 
by a single hegemon who acts as a stabilizing force by displaying 
specific commitments and deploying relevant capabilities.  The resulting 
configuration remains intact, hence hegemonic stability, even in the face 
of selective free riding by other participants—as long as there are no 
marked shifts in the distribution of State power and the hegemon does 
not retreat into indifference or negativism.124  Realist-style regimes may 
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encompass a wide range of patterned interstate behavior, exhibiting 
characteristics which are accorded considerable attention in contemporary 
theories of international law, such as coincidence of interest, coordination, 
cooperation, and coercion.125 
A noteworthy feature of the realist conception is the assumption that 
States are highly sensitive to relative gains or losses.  Specifically, they 
go to great lengths to insure that, subject to any meaningful constraints 
stemming from disparities in State capabilities to affect outcomes, other 
parties do not obtain more from an agreement than they do.  Cooperation 
is thus more likely to materialize in situations where a broadly equitable 
course can be readily followed.  In practice, this is typically the case in 
the economic domain, because pursuing rough symmetry may not be a 
practical option in the military realm, given the prevalence of hegemonic 
limitations, irrespective of whether the hegemon is “benevolent” or 
“malevolent”, although this is obviously a relevant factor.126  However, 
even in the economic sphere, State power may be a key determinant of 
the actual shape of the bilateral or multilateral accord.127 
In terms of behavioral range, liberals cast their analytical net less wide 
than realists.  As befitting the intellectual successors to idealists, they 
primarily focus on cooperation, which they distinguish from harmony 
and discord.128  Collaborative interaction is rooted in State interdependence 
rather than State dominance.  The presence of a hegemon is not a 
necessary condition for regime formation and persistence.  Power is not 
a decisive element in the overall equation.  It neither definitively shapes 
State preferences nor exclusively determines regime evolution.  Even if 
they do not conform to the supposedly stability-enhancing unipolar 
pattern, international regimes generate concrete benefits for members 
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(e.g., they crystallize expectations regarding interstate behavior, lower 
transaction costs, furnish valuable information with respect to actions of 
other participants, reduce uncertainty, and solidify external linkages), 
thus fostering a cooperative spirit.129 
Liberals express misgivings about the modeling of international reality 
along the lines of the classic single-round, two-person prisoner’s dilemma 
game, in which the payoff structure renders defection a dominant 
strategy for both players, arguing that realists implicitly follow this 
methodological path.  According to them, behavioral responses in one-
off situations should not serve as a basis for drawing inferences concerning 
interstate relations, which need to be sustained over long periods of time.  
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is a more effective analytical tool 
for explaining sequential decision making under uncertainty in dynamic 
international settings.  In such circumstances, it is rational for States to 
cooperate in the present in order to prevent other States from defecting 
in the future (i.e., pursue a tit-for-tat strategy) and to focus on absolute—
as distinct from relative—gains from collaboration.130 
The State is the principal focus of theoretical attention in both realist 
and liberal accounts of international regime development, although the 
latter offers greater scope for incorporating non-State actors into the 
conceptual framework.  While they are not always made unambiguously 
explicit, State goals obviously diverge rather than converge in realist and 
liberal explanatory schemes.  At the same time, the State is viewed from 
the two perspectives not merely as an autonomous, purposeful, and 
unitary entity but also as an entirely rational one.  This is consistent with 
contemporary international legal theories which obtain their inspiration 
from microeconomics, without unequivocally embracing methodological 
individualism.  Such theories posit that, like corporations, States may be 
regarded as agents with a clear identity, cohesive structure, well-defined 
preferences and instrumental orientation.131 
Several branches of the law have an increasingly productive conceptual 
relationship with economics, albeit a largely one-sided in nature.  
International legal theory, even of a contemporary vintage, continues to 
veer more strongly toward other behavioral sciences such as political 
sociology.  The prominent New Haven-Yale school of international law 
thus places a heavy emphasis on social choice processes relied upon in 
pursuing community well-being, jurisprudential goals.  In recent years, 
 
 129. For an overview, see id. 
 130. For an overview, see id.; ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
(1984); Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation under Hierarchy: 
Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226, 226–54 (1985); COOPERATION UNDER 
ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986). 
 131. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 123, at 4–10. 
MUSHKAT 6/15/2009  9:25:06 AM 
[VOL. 10:  381, 2009]  Open Skies 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 433 
its exponents have resolutely challenged the State-focused, nationalist 
model embraced by economically-minded legal researchers (i.e., the 
assumption that “‛international law emerges from States’ pursuit of self-
centered policies on the international stage”).132  They have consistently 
painted a highly pluralistic picture of the global legal landscape133 
featuring a host of significant non-State actors and powerful bottom-up, 
as distinct from top-down, State-driven forces.134 
Cognitivism, a variant or an extension of constructivism, which posits 
that, although a real world exists, it does not possess an inherent meaning, 
has sociological underpinnings too, albeit ones of the micro rather than 
macro variety, social-psychology versus political sociology.  Its conception 
of international regimes reflects the belief that agents or States engage in 
action in a social as well as a material setting and that this setting 
provides them with an understanding of their interests.  The corollary is 
that agents or States are not necessarily rational players, that they cannot 
be isolated in a positivist fashion from their socio-political environment 
for analytical purposes, that perceptions of interest and power matter, 
that such perceptions are not static, that different constructions of interest 
and power are a common phenomenon, and that iteration—both in 
game-like situations and the real world—is accompanied by learning 
(i.e., that agents or States do not merely discount the future but draw 
lessons from the past and respond accordingly).135 
Subjectivity, or inter-subjectivity, is thus a key component of cognitivist 
regime theories.  The emphasis is on the acquisition of contextual and 
differential meaning via the performance of roles in complex and 
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dynamic social settings.  The ideas that crystallize in such circumstances 
exert a strong influence on agents’ or States’ behavioral trajectories and, 
by implication, regime evolution, as shown in Table 4.  It follows that 
idea formation, selection, dissemination, and implementation are crucial 
processes that ought to loom large on the international law/relations 
research agenda, hence the focus on epistemic communities which 
generate, prioritize, share, and promote policy ideas.  Regimes also shape 
agents’ or States’ perceptions of international reality, including their 
own derived identities, and provide them with cues regarding acceptable, 
desirable, or legitimate modes of international conduct (i.e., they have 
constitutive, as well as regulative, effects).136 
TABLE 4                                                                                                              
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON                                                        
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
 REALISM LIBERALISM COGNITIVISM 
CENTRAL VARIABLE Power Interests Knowledge 
METATHEORETICAL 
ORIENTATION 









INSTITUTIONALISM Weak Medium Strong 
 
Adapted from Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, op.cit., p. 6. 
 
A number of potentially useful observations may be offered with 
respect to the three competing conceptual schemes, as well as related 
theoretical constructs, outlined above in light of Hong Kong’s open skies 
experience.  First, no single analytical framework may claim universal 
validity; their relevance apparently varies from one issue-area to another 
and one set of structural conditions to another (i.e., achieving situational 
validity may be a less ambitious, but more appropriate, objective for 
their proponents); as matters stand, attempts to design an overarching 
conceptual scheme may prove unproductive, particularly since the scope 
for systematically integrating individual international regime theories 
seems limited.137  Second, even if taken together and augmented by 
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incorporating complementary mainstream perspectives, the three analytical 
frameworks do not provide a sufficiently comprehensive foundation for 
exploring patterned interstate behavior; domestically-oriented, and thus 
non-mainstream from a broader viewpoint conceptual schemes focused 
on the regulatory function may shed further light on the functioning of 
international legal regimes such as the open skies platform. Third, 
theory construction must not be exclusively based on samples or case 
studies heavily skewed toward the United States or Europe and the analytical 
effort should be extended across the entire geographic spectrum; the 
inclusion of cases not readily conforming to the “dominant” politico-
economic and socio-political model may turn out to be an especially 
beneficial step. 
Interestingly, the realist school, the oldest and least fashionable of the 
three, paints a picture most consistent with the specific empirical trends 
identified in this paper.  The open skies regime has displayed hegemonic 
characteristics throughout most of its history and its relatively high 
degree of stability may be legitimately attributed to hegemonic influences.  
By the same token, the principle of reciprocity, envisioning relative 
rather than absolute agent or State gains, lies at the heart of the system, 
both in the normative and practical sense of the term.  As an economically 
active, but politically marginal, member of the regime, Hong Kong has 
opted for a strategy of opportunistic adaptation, largely following an 
exogenously charted course whose features have been more or less 
determined in hegemonic headquarters. Unlike in many other similar 
domains (e.g., trade in goods and most services, foreign investment), the 
territory has not sought absolute gains, which could have conceivably 
resulted in the long run from unilateral opening of its skies, and has 
consistently, even rigidly, adhered to the relativist formula. 
The State has clearly played a pivotal role in the process. This again 
conforms to realist portrayals of international regime dynamics, without 
diverging from liberal and economically-inspired nationalist, in contemporary 
international law, ones.  Subject to the qualification that the adjective 
has no precise empirical meaning, and taking prevailing domestic and 
external constraints into consideration, there is no reason to suggest that 
State actions have been not predominantly rational on the open skies 
front.  Once more, this is not at variance with realist, as well as liberal 
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and economically-inspired nationalist, predictions.  Elsewhere, notably 
in American hegemonic territory, there may have been strong pluralist-
style bottom-up forces at work, although as a whole the open skies 
regime seems to be characterized by a relatively low degree of institutional 
fragmentation. Yet, this has not been the case in Hong Kong, and 
presumably in many other jurisdictions, Singapore being an obvious 
example. 
That said, the realist model does not fit the empirical facts in all 
respects.  The open skies regime has matured considerably and no longer 
depends critically on a single hegemon for its survival.  From a structural 
perspective, it currently resembles a loose duopoly, with the European 
community serving as an economic counterweight to the United States.  
Liberal-type conceptions of cooperation, possibly reinforced by some 
cognitivist influences, may be contributing to its persistence, indeed, 
steady quantitative and qualitative expansion.  Within this institutional 
framework, Hong Kong enjoys a growing room for maneuver, particularly 
if China is removed from the equation for analytical purposes, and, in 
terms of policy content, has forged moderately diversified commercial 
relations with a substantial number of “partners” across the globe.  A 
higher degree of diversity could have been achieved, had it not been for 
a self-imposed strategic restraint. 
Moreover, the pivotal role played by the State should not be equated 
with an exclusive one.  The unitary realist construct does not accord 
even with the mildly differentiated Hong Kong institutional landscape, 
let alone with genuinely pluralist ones.  The same obviously holds true 
for its liberal and economically-inspired/nationalist counterparts.  The 
territory’s political system may be executive led, but it is not rigidly top-
down driven.  As pointed out, a close partnership between government 
and business has been a key hallmark of the local institutional 
environment since the inception of the colonial era to the present.  Like 
the current open skies regime, the overall pattern is structurally similar 
to a market duopoly.  The concept of State interest, supposedly pursued 
in a determined fashion by political agents, is thus distinctly ambiguous.  
The issue of “whose interest” is being sought can not be conveniently 
overlooked, other than for purposes of conducting controlled analytical 
experiments.  This is selectively acknowledged in the liberal and economically- 
inspired nationalist literature but not explored as thoroughly as in 
domestically-oriented writings on regulatory behavior. 
On the face of it, cognitivism appears to be the product of theoretical 
over-specification: too many esoteric variables substantially imported 
from developmental psychology are potentially brought to bear with 
excessive precision on a problem involving an essentially businesslike 
government which grapples with concrete challenges in a seemingly 
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practical manner.  This school of thought however is not irrelevant in 
this context.  Ideas, as distinct from power and interests, have clearly 
been a key factor in shaping the evolution of the open skies regime, 
particularly at decisive turning points.  Whether or not they can be 
meaningfully decoupled from power and interests, ideas have considerable 
explanatory value and merit close scholarly attention.  To their credit, 
cognitivists have approached this task methodically and have tentatively 
identified social mechanisms facilitating idea formation, selection, 
sharing, and promotion.  With reference to Hong Kong, the question 
relates to the impediments to the flow of locally well-entrenched 
liberatarian ideas pertaining to the open skies platform.  As argued here, 
the answer partly lies in the institutional domain, although cognitivist-style 
probing may yield additional insights. 
According to liberals and cognitivists, institutions matter.  The former 
neatly reconcile this posture with the notion of State-focused utility 
maximization, the latter discard it unambiguously.  Both schools of thought 
offer accounts of regime development which are heavily tilted toward 
the international institutional component.  The domestic scene is largely 
relegated to the analytical periphery. Yet, the Hong Kong open skies 
experience suggests that, on balance, domestic institutional factors outweigh 
international ones in such circumstances. The territory’s low-risk strategy 
on this front is mostly the product of domestic influences—the China 
element being the sole notable exception to the rule and, even in that 
regard, internal and external effects may be viewed as two sides of the 
same domestic coin.  This configuration may well be typical of bilateral 
legal regimes aimed at controlling private sector activity, which tend to 
be strongly underpinned by domestic forces at the margin, where 
explanatory efforts should be directed.  The corollary arguably is that 
domestically-oriented theories of regulation should be incorporated into 
conceptual schemes centered on such regimes. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Hong Kong’s symbolic status as the last bastion of the laissez-faire 
intellectual tradition may have undergone mild erosion since the heyday 
of the colonial era, but it remains largely intact from a comparative 
perspective.  For the most part, the territory conducts its external economic 
affairs in accordance with the neoclassical logic and exponents of the 
Chicago school continue to extol its virtues, even if somewhat simplistically.  
Immigration policies are a notable exception to the rule, yet this is a 
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strategic domain universally governed by altogether different principles, 
indeed one where international law plays scarcely any meaningful role.  
Aviation policies also selectively qualify as an outlier, at least with 
respect to the open skies platform.  In this sphere of externally-directed 
economic activity, Hong Kong has generally proceeded cautiously and, 
in terms of certain relevant criteria, has failed to live up to its libertarian 
reputation.  Theories of regulatory behavior may effectively account for 
the gap between economically-grounded expectations and actual performance. 
This specific empirical pattern is not without broader analytical 
implications, particularly for international legal regimes.  Such systems 
have traditionally been explored from three conceptual perspectives, 
some more mainstream than others: realist, liberal, and cognitivist.  
Economically-inspired nationalist insights and those of the New Haven 
school have also provided pertinent illumination.  The Hong Kong open 
skies experience suggests that none of these theoretical frameworks 
holds sway in all circumstances.  Nor are they sufficient in themselves, 
whether individually or collectively, to furnish a wide-ranging basis for 
a thorough understanding of international legal regime evolution.  Analytical 
contributions from additional sources, including domestically-oriented 
ones, may be needed.  Last but not least, theory construction and 
empirical validation should not be narrowly confined to the political 
core of the global system but be extended to its large and significant 
periphery. 

